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Mexican-American Litigation Experience
INTRODUCTION

Perhaps surprisingly, some commentators have argued that
minority scholars often have been excluded from the debate
regarding key issues of race or civil rights law.' Arguably, any such
exclusion caused the literature dealing with race and American law
to be distorted and seriously incomplete.' In response, critical race
scholars have begun to explore civil rights issues.' Nonetheless, to
date, no one has undertaken a critical examination of the MexicanAmerican litigation experience in light of contemporary jurisprudential and critical scholarship. 4 This article seeks to help fill that
void and contribute to the on-going reevaluation of issues of race
and law.5
In particular, the article explores a jurisprudential point: legal
indeterminacy in the context of Mexican-American civil rights litigation.6 Traditional legal theory has recognized that legal doctrine
is sometimes indeterminate in that it does not always dictate
1 This position has been forcefully defended by Richard Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 561 (1984). He has written: "I think I have discovered a second scholarly
tradition. It consists of white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion
of minority scholars from, the central areas of civil rights scholarship." Id. at
566.
2 See id. at 566-73 (excluding minority writings about key issues of race law
causes "bluntings, skewings, and omissions in the literature dealing with race,
racism and American Law").
3 See Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44
VAND. L. REv. 1, 6 (1991) (stating that critical race scholarship developed in
late 1970s with realization that 1960s civil rights movement was losing
ground).
4 There are some older works addressing some aspects of the MexicanAmerican civil rights movement. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Victoria
Palacios, Mexican-Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class Under Rule 23 and the
Equal Protection Clause, 50 NoTRE DAME LAW. 393 (1975); Gary A. Greenfield &
Don B. Kates, Jr., Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 63 CAL. L. REV. 662 (1975); Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala,
Project Report, Dejure Segregationof Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 307 (1972); Guadalupe Salinas, Comment, Mexican-Americans and the
Desegregation of Schools in the Southwest, 8 Hous. L. REv. 929 (1971).
5 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Taking Rights Aggressively: The Perils and Promise
of CriticalLegal Theory for Peoples of Color, 5 LAw & INEQ. J. 103, 127-28 (1987)
(arguing that critical legal theory provides way for minorities to decode
dominant culture's legal texts and help bring about social transformation).
6 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and
Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 328 (1987) (arguing importance
of understanding how legal indeterminacy works in specific contexts).
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results.7 For example, H.L.A. Hart writes that " [ i]n every legal system a large and important field is left open for the exercise of discretion by courts and other officials in rendering initially vague
standards determinate, in resolving the uncertainties of statutes, or
in developing and qualifying rules only broadly communicated by
authoritative precedents."' More recently, pragmatists, critical legal
scholars, and others have argued that law is indeterminate in the
sense that legal materials-statutes and court decisions-often permit a judge to justify multiple outcomes to lawsuits.9
In light of this open texture in the law, legal theorists have
argued that judicial decisions are often not logically compelled and
are instead the result of conscious or unconscious discretionary policy choices.1 ° Accordingly, one of the goals of this article is to
7

See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal

Theory, 94 YALE LJ. 1, 11-12 (1984) (stating traditional legal theory
incorporates indeterminacy).
8 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 132 (1961).
9 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 23 (1990)
("Moreover, the American legal tradition is now so rich, variegated, conflicted,
and ambivalent that a strand of it can easily be found to support either side in
difficult cases."); DAVID KAIRYS, THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
140, 160-61 (1982) ("[Slince precedents and reasoning can be distinguished,
modified, or discarded, they do not require any particular rule or result....
[T] he law merely provides a variety of bases for justifying choices made on
other grounds."); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 819 (1983) (arguing
that prior decisions cannot constrain present decisions because "it turns out
that the limits of craft are so broad that in any interesting case any reasonably
skilled lawyer can reach whatever result he or she wants"); Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685 (1976)
(describing how law is infused with irreconcilably opposed principles and
ideals).
10 See, e.g., GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE 642 (1973). One of the
goals of the American legal realists was to show that legal results were not
logically compelled and that judicial decisions were "really the result of policy
preferences. The realists wanted to expose these policy choices, particularly
when they were unconscious choices." Id.; see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REV. 593 (1958) (stating that
when legal rules do not dictate result, judicial decisions are made in light of
social policies). The notion of judicial discretion also raises important
questions about the legitimacy of judicial decision-making. See POSNER, supra
note 9, at 21. Judge Posner stated:
The idea of judicial discretion - a blank space or black box, not
the solution to the problem of deciding cases when the rules run
out but merely the name of the problem - is no matter how
fancied up, a source of unease to the legal profession. If, much of
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demonstrate that courts' decisions either for or against MexicanAmericans were often not inevitable or compelled. In so doing,
policy choices of the courts are revealed and brought to the surface.
This article argues that exposing the exercise of judicial discretion
and the lack of inevitability in civil rights cases is important for two
principal reasons. At one level, exposing the exercise of judicial
discretion is significant because it helps reveal the extent to which
the courts have helped or failed to help establish the rights of Mexican-Americans. At another level, exposing false necessity in judicial
decision-making by explaining how the decision might have gone
another way-i.e., offering a counterstory"-is important because
it may help break down barriers to racial reform. Drawing on critical race theory, legal pragmatism, and the philosophy of science,
this article argues that providing judges with counterstories or alternative perspectives on civil rights issues is one way to help them
overcome the "unthinking conviction that [their] way of seeing the
world is the only one-that the way things are is inevitable, natural,
just, and best."'" By acknowledging their limited perspective,
judges can avoid serious moral error and promote justice in civil
3
rights cases.1
This article analyzes the published decisions concerning Mexican-American efforts to litigate certain civil rights issues for the
years 1930 to 1980. Part I identifies how Mexican-Americans have
the time, and certainly in the most interesting cases, judges are
legislators, why are they not subject to the same political - today,
democratic - controls as legislators?
Id.
11 See Richard Delgado, Stoytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for

Narrative, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2411, 2414 (1989) (recommending
counterstorytelling in order to "shatter complacency and challenge the status
quo"). As one commentator has observed, there is almost no legal subject that
cannot be viewed as some form of story. SeeJane B. Baron, Resistance to Stories,
67 S. CAL.L. REv. 255, 255 n. 3 (1994). Indeed, "[f]aw is itself a story." Id. at
262 (citing Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An
Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807, 807 (1993)).
12 Delgado, supra note 11, at 2439.
13 Id.; see also Richard Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can
Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1929, 1958 (1991) (exposing
false necessity in civil rights law can enable 'Judges to avoid the types of
mistakes we include within the term 'serious moral error'"); Martha Minow,
Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 95 (1987) ("Justice is
engendered when judges admit the limitations of their own view-points, when
judges reach beyond those limits by trying to see from contrasting perspectives
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challenged discrimination in the areas of public accommodations,
land grants, restrictive covenants, and racial slurs. Part II of this
article notes that Mexican-Americans also have confronted segregation in public schools and have been litigating to eliminate that
form of oppression since 1930. The more recent struggle in the
courts to establish a right to bilingual and bicultural education
under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is also examined in Part
II. Overall, the article argues that because of legal uncertainty or
indeterminacy, the resolution of key issues often was not inevitable.
Judges often had discretion to reach their conclusions. The article,
however, seeks to do more than establish that important
conclusion.
Part III of this article draws some general conclusions from the
cases about the effects of legal indeterminacy and judicial discretion. In this regard, the article concludes that the courts generally
exercised their discretion by taking a position against MexicanAmericans on key issues. Part III also seeks to place the article in
the context of a larger effort to generate legal reform in the areas
of race and civil rights. Exposing the lack of inevitability in civil
rights judicial decision-making may help eliminate barriers to racial
reform. Applying the insights of critical race theory, legal pragmatism, and the philosophy of science, this article concludes that justice can be promoted in civil rights cases by providing judges with
alternative perspectives on civil rights issues.
I.

MEXICAN-AMERICANs TAKING A STAND:

LITIGATION IN THE

AREAS OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS, LAND GRANTs,

REsTRcTrIvE COVENANTS, AND RACIAL SLURS

Mexican-Americans have challenged discrimination in the areas
of public accommodations, land grants, restrictive covenants, and
ethnic slurs. As the discussion below illustrates, the cases indicate
that the outcomes in these lawsuits often were not inevitable.
A. Public Accommodations
Throughout history, racial discrimination has been based on the
notion that certain groups of people are inferior to the white
majority.14 One of the ways that the dominant group in our society
14

See generally DERRICK BELL,

RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw

(3d ed.

1992); STEPHENJ. GOuLD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); RUDOIWO ACU&A,
OCCUPIED AMERICA: THE CHICANO'S STRUGGLE TowARD LIBERATION (1972); A.
LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978); .

1994]

Mexican-American Litigation Experience

has branded minorities as inferior has been to exclude them from
places where members of the white Christian majority were free to
travel or live."5 There are three published cases in which MexicanAmericans have challenged this form of discrimination: Lueras v.
Town of Lafayette,' 6 Terrell Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez,17 and
Lopez v. Secombe. is Each case deals with access to a public swimming
pool and is discussed in turn.
The earliest published decision is Lueras v. Town of Lafayette. 9
Mexican-American plaintiffs alleged that defendant town and other
officials had violated plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights by
refusing to admit them to a public swimming pool.2" The town had
leased the pool to a volunteer fire department. The fire department placed a sign outside the pool stating that it was for use by
whites only. Plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that they had a
constitutional right to use the pool. 2 ' The court refused to grant
that judgment.2 2 Although the reasoning of the court is unclearthe court cited no cases and offered no clear legal analysis-the
court apparently refused to issue that judgment because it concluded that the leasing arrangement relieved the town of any duty
to admit plaintiffs to the pool. 23 Lueras appears to be an example of
a government entity attempting to avoid desegregation by leasing a
public pool to a private party, the volunteer fire department. In the
early years of the civil rights movement, a number of governmental
entities used this tactic in their attempts to circumvent federal antidiscrimination laws.2 4 The Fourteenth Amendment forbids racial
15 See LAURENCE H. TmiBE, AMERCAN CONSTrrunONAL LAW § 16-15, at 1477
(2d ed. 1988) (stating that racial segregation's appearance of "symmetry" is
false because segregation represents and reinforces "white supremacy").
16 65 P.2d 1431 (Colo. 1937).
17 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
18

71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944).

19 65 P.2d 1431 (Colo. 1937).

Id. at 1431.
Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 1432. It is interesting that although the court did not provide
plaintiffs with relief, it emphasized the trial judge's misgivings about racial
20
21

discrimination. The court observed that racial discrimination tended to
produce antagonisms potentially harmful to society. Id.
24 See Mitchell P. House, Jr., Comment, Constitutionality of "Segregation by
Indirection" Through Sale or Lease of Public RecreationalFacilities,8 MERCER L. REV.
355 (1957).
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discrimination by state action, not private action. 25 Thus, these
leasing arrangements allowed a defendant to argue that the discrimination was not unconstitutional because it did not result from
state action, but rather from private action.2 6
To the extent that Lueras exemplifies such an effort to circumvent the law, the court might have resolved it differently. Later
courts struck down similar arrangements intended to circumvent
federal anti-discrimination laws. 2'7 For example, in Lawrence v. Hancock,28 an African-American plaintiff sought to compel city officials
to admit him to a public swimming pool. The city had leased the
pool to a private operator who had refused to admit plaintiff. The
court held that the leasing arrangement did not relieve the city of
its constitutional2 9obligation to afford all of its citizens equal rights
to use the pool.
25 See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1688 (observing that almost all constitutional
guarantees of individual rights protect against only government action); JOHN
E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTITTIONAL LAw 452 (4th ed. 1991)
(noting that constitutional amendments that protect individual liberties
address federal and state actions).
26 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
There the court held that "U]ustice would be blind indeed if she failed to
detect the real purpose in this effort of the City of Montgomery to clothe a
public function with the mantle of private responsibility." Id. The court
recognized that this practice was "clearly but another in the long series of
stratagems which governing bodies of many white communities have
employed in attempting to deprive the Negro of his constitutional birthright;
the equal protection of the laws." Id.; see also Culver v. City of Warren, 83
N.E.2d 82, 88 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948) (holding lease to veterans organization
was subterfuge adopted by city to avoid its constitutional obligation under
Fourteenth Amendment). See generally House, supra note 24.
27 See Department of Conserv. and Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615, 616 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956) (holding state could not avoid its
constitutional requirement of non-discrimination by leasing to private
business); Anderson v. Moses, 185 F. Supp. 727, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding
Tavern-on-the-Green was instrumentality of state because it was operated on
state property and was subject to state control; and therefore, it was subject to
Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits discrimination because of race or
color); Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (S.D. W. Va. 1948)
(holding city could not evade its constitutional obligations to afford all its
citizens equal rights to use public swimming pool by leasing pool to private
party); Kern v. City Comm'rs of Newton, 100 P.2d 709, 713 (Kan. 1940)
(holding city could not lease property to private party to evade constitutional
obligations).
28 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
29 Id. at 1008.
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563

At the time of the Lueras and Lawrence decisions, the Supreme
Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson"0 provided some authority for
the proposition that states could racially segregate public places."'
Courts, however, interpreted Plessy to authorize segregation of
minorities only so long as they received separate services or treatment purportedly equal to that provided for whites. 32 Although the
Lawrence court did not discuss Plessy, the court may not have applied
Plessy because the city had not provided separate but equal swimming facilities for African-Americans. 3 3 Similarly, it appears that
Plessy would not have authorized the segregation in Lueras. The
opinion does not indicate that the town had provided separate but
equal facilities for Mexican-Americans.
In any event, in 1937 the Lueras case taught Mexican-Americans
that the American legal process would not always be responsive to
their problems. Nevertheless, Mexican-Americans elsewhere continued to litigate access to public accommodations.
Terrell Wells Swimming Pool v. Rodriguez, 4 decided during the Second World War, arose in Texas. Jacob Rodriguez sought an injunction requiring the defendant swimming pool operator to offer
equal accommodations to all persons of Mexican descent.3 5 The
lower court granted the injunction.3 6 The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals reversed. The appellate court held that, in the absence of
civil rights legislation to the contrary, the proprietor of a privately
operated
place of amusement may exclude any person for any
37
reason.

In reaching its decision, the Terrell Wells court rejected an ingenious argument by plaintiff. Plaintiff contended that the pre30

163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding segregation on passenger trains).

See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 619 (stating that doctrine of
P/essy v. Fergusonwas used to sanction widespread segregation in public schools
and other state institutions); BELL, supra note 14, at 112-16.
32 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 617. Between 1896 and 1954,
the concept of "separate but equal" allowed separate treatment for persons of
minority races if their treatment was equal to that provided for whites. Id. In
fact, the "apparent symmetry in treatment created only a shallow illusion of
equality." TRIBE, supra note 15, § 16-15, at 1475. The stereotypes of racial
inferiority were created and sustained by the social stigma and attendant
circumstances resulting from legally imposed racial segregation. Id. at 1477.
33 See Lawrence, 76 F. Supp. at 1010.
34 182 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944).
35 Id. at 825.
31

36
37

Id.
Id.
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existing law had been changed by a Texas House Concurrent Resolution. The resolution, which had been passed by the Texas legislature and proclaimed by the governor, established as a matter of
Texas public policy that all Caucasians were entitled to equal
accommodations.38 Plaintiff argued that he could not be excluded
from the pool on the basis of his Mexican ancestry because that
would violate the public policy expressed in the resolution. 9 The
court refused to enforce the public policy on the ground that the
concurrent resolution did not have the effect of a statute.4 ° Thus,
the corporation retained the right to exclude persons of Mexican
descent.
The Tenell Wells court's conclusion that the concurrent resolution did not have the effect of a statute is questionable. Significantly, the court ignored Texas Supreme Court authority
establishing the proposition that a joint resolution, when approved
by the governor, was as binding as a statute.4" The governor had
38

The resolution declared the following Texas public policy:

1. All persons of the Caucasian Race within the jurisdiction of
this State are entitled to the full and equal accommodations... of
all public places of business or amusement ....
2. Whoever denies to any person the full advantages... except
for good cause applicable alike to all persons of the Caucasian
Race ... shall be considered as violating the good neighbor policy
of our State.
Id. at 826. The resolution came about because discrimination against Mexican-Americans in Texas had been particularly egregious. See Greenfield &
Kates, supra note 4, at 706. As a result, the Mexican Ministry of Labor declared
in 1943 that no more Mexicans would be allowed to go to Texas. See id. In
response, the Texas legislature passed the concurrent resolution at issue in
Terrell Wells. See id.
39 Terrell Wells, 112 S.W.2d at 826.
40 Id. Subsequently, the Texas legislature failed to pass a bill which
expressly prohibited discrimination against Mexican-Americans.
See
Greenfield & Kates, supra note 4, at 706-07.
41 See Terrell v. King, 14 S.W.2d 786, 793 (Tex. 1929) ("It is no longer an
open question in Texas that ajoint resolution of both houses, approved by the
Governor, reflects the command and will of the state in one of the modes
prescribed by the Constitution, and is as binding as a statute."); see Weekes v.
City of Galveston, 51 S.W. 544, 547 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) (holding that joint
resolutions have "the force and effect of law" and are "imperative upon the
courts"). In Terrell Wells, the court instead relied on cases stating that a
concurrent resolution did not have the effect of a statute. The court, however,
could have distinguished or avoided those cases on the grounds that (1) they
did not involve resolutions that had been proclaimed by the governor, and (2)
they were, in any event, contrary to the Texas Supreme Court's position in
Terrell v. King.
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approved the resolution at issue in Terrell Wells.4 2 Thus, if the court
had followed binding precedent, it should have found that the resolution had the binding effect of a statute.
Moreover, the Terrell Wells court's determination that it could not
enforce the public policy against discrimination in the absence of
legislation was not logically compelled. In James v. Marinship
Corp.,43 decided in the same year, the California Supreme Court
held that a private labor union could not discriminate against African-Americans. The court found that the labor union discrimination violated the public policy against race discrimination expressed
in the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.4 4 The court
expressly held that a statute was not necessary to enforce the public
policy against racial discrimination when private rather than public
action was involved. 4 5 Thus, arguably, the Terrell Wells court could
have enforced the anti-discrimination public policy expressed in
the resolution or in the Federal Constitution to prevent public
accommodation discrimination against Mexican-Americans.
In Lopez v. Seccombe,46 plaintiffs sought to enjoin the City of San
Bernardino and other officials from excluding Mexican-Americans
from the public swimming pool and park facilities. 47 Without
explaining its reasoning, the court held that defendants had violated plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and
issued an injunction.4"
The Lopez court's decision to uphold the rights of Mexican-Americans is puzzling because the court did not articulate the basis for its
ruling. The court did not explain why Pessy did not authorize the
segregation or whether public policy concerns played a role. If
Plessy was not applicable because the city had failed to provide separate but equal facilities for Mexican-Americans, then Lopez indicates

Terrell Wells, 182 S.W.2d at 826.
43 155 P.2d 329 (1944).
44 Id. at 339.
45 Id. at 340; see also Black v. Cutter Lab., 278 P.2d 905, 917 (Cal. 1955)
(stating that courts may be called upon to recognize and give special effect to
public policy).
46 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
47 The court found that the defendant had prevented Mexican-Americans
from using the public park solely because they were of Mexican descent. Id. at
771.
48 Id. at 772.
42

566
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how the separate but equal doctrine limited the Lopez court's discretion to rule against the Mexican-American plaintiffs.4 9
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the Supreme Court and
other authorities have claimed that state courts were reluctant to
enforce the rights of minorities. Because of this reluctance, they
contend, it has been left up to the federal courts to guarantee
minorities' constitutional rights.5 ° The fact that state courts in both
Lueras and Terrell Wells denied the rights of Mexican-Americans provides some support for that proposition.
B.

Land Grants

Mexican-Americans have contended that they were illegally
deprived of land in those areas of the southwest that Mexico ceded
to the United States in 1848 under the Treaty of Guadalupe
49 Cf Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that state could not
exclude African-Americans from law school where state had not provided
substantially equal law school for African-Americans).
50 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972). The
predecessor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorized a federal remedy against state
officials who deprived individuals of their federal civil rights. Id. at 240.
Congress enacted the statute because "state courts were being used to harass
and injure individuals, either because the state courts were powerless to stop
deprivations or were in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of
federally protected rights." Id.; see also Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1105-06 (1977) (arguing that state courts "are less likely to
be receptive to vigorous enforcement of federal constitutional doctrine" and
that forum allocation decisions should be viewed "not as outcome-neutral
allocations of judicial business but as indirect decisions on the merits, which
weaken disfavored federal constitutional rights by remitting their enforcement
to less receptive state forums"); Anthony G. Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutions
Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus
Jurisdictionto Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965). The author
notes that
[T]he Civil War radically altered the view which the national
legislature had previously taken, that generally the state
legislatures, courts, and executive officials were the sufficient
protectors of the rights of the American people. The assumption
was abandoned that the state courts were the normal place for
enforcement of federal law save in rare and narrow instances
where they affirmatively demonstrated themselves unfit or unfair.
Now the federal courts were seen as the needed organs, the
ordinary and natural agencies, for the administration of federal
rights.
Id. at 828.
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Hidalgo.5" The Treaty, which resolved the Mexican-American War,
forced Mexico to cede much of what is now the American Southwest.5 2 The Treaty professed to respect prior Spanish and Mexican
land grants; nevertheless, federal laws and American businesses
divested Mexican-Americans in California and the Southwest of
most of their land.53
In Vigil v. United States,54 plaintiff Mexican-Americans brought a
class action against the United States. Plaintiffs brought the action
on behalf of Mexican-American descendants of the original recipients of land grants made by Spain and Mexico. Plaintiffs argued
that the United States had taken that land without compensation in
violation of the Federal Constitution. 55 The court held that the
complaint had failed to state a claim and dismissed the suit. The
court ruled that plaintiffs had failed to set forth specific facts to
support the allegations in the complaint.5 6 Significantly, the court
did not cite any authority supporting the proposition that a plaintiff
See Vigil v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Colo. 1968) (discussed
infra notes 54-58), affd, 430 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1970).
52 See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Law of the American West: A Critical
Bibliography of the Nonlegal Services, 85 MICH. L. REv. 953, 969 (1987). The
Mexican-American War, a product of American expansionism, culminated in
1848 in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Id. Under the Treaty, the United
States compelled Mexico to cede California, Nevada, Utah, most of Arizona,
and parts of New Mexico, Colorado, and Wyoming. Id. Overall, The Republic
of Mexico lost nearly one-half its territory. Id.
53 Id.; see Salinas, supra note 4, at 936 (stating that Mexican-Americans lost
millions of acres of land following enactment of Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo).
54 293 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Colo. 1968), affid, 430 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1970).
55 Plaintiffs alleged that they were descendants of persons who received the
Beaubien-Miranda Grant and the Tierra Amarilla Grant. Id. at 1180.
56 Id. at 1184. The court held the complaint defective because it was
based on the general allegation that the plaintiffs and their
ancestors were beneficiaries of land grants made by Spain and
Mexico and that the United States Government has taken the
lands subject to such grants without providing just compensation
to the plaintiffs or their ancestors in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Precisely what land the plaintiffs or their ancestors
claimed title to under the land grants is not stated in the
complaint, nor are there any allegations pointing out the land
which the government has taken, how the Government took such
land or when the Government took it, not to mention a
description of the interests taken.
51
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must plead specific facts in order to state a claim.17 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating
only that the trial court's
58
judgment was "manifestly correct."
The decision in Vigil is an example of false necessity in civil rights
decision-making. The court's conclusion that the complaint was
defective because the plaintiff failed to allege specific facts to support the claim was contrary to Supreme Court authority and was not
authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In ConLey v.
Gibson,59 the Supreme Court endorsed Federal Rule 8(a)'s notice
pleading requirement.' The Court cautioned courts against dismissing a complaint for failing to state a claim unless it was manifestly clear that the plaintiff could not plead any facts in support of
her claim.6 1 Applying this principle, the Conley Court expressly
rejected the defendant's argument that the complaint should be
dismissed because it failed to set forth specific facts to support its
general allegations of race discrimination.6 2 Thus, in general, the
57 See id. In general, the federal rules of civil procedure do not require
specific fact pleading. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (discussing
pleading standard).
58 Vigil v. United States, 430 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1970).
59 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
60 In 1938, the Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a). SeeJACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., CML PROCEDURE 253 (2d ed. 1993)
(discussing Rule 8 and basic requirements of notice pleading). Rule 8(a) (2)
requires a party to set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). This established the
concept of "notice pleading." FRIENDENT-AL, ET AL., supra, at 253. The idea
behind the new rule was that cases should not be decided on the pleadings,
but instead should be decided on the merits, by jury trial after full disclosure

through discovery. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact PleadingUnder the
FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 439 (1986).
61 Conley, 355 U.S. at 43 (stating that "complaint should not be dismissed
for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief").
62 Id. at 47. The Court explained:
The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts
upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the rules
require is "a short and plain statement of the claim that will give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiffs" claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.
Id. In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993), the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Conley v.
Gibson. There, the Supreme Court rejected a heightened pleading standard
for civil rights cases. Id. at 1161. The Court observed that the heightened

1994]

Mexican-American Litigation Experience

569

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not authorize federal courts to
require specific fact pleading.6" Under these circumstances, the
Vigil court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' complaint was defective
for lack of specificity is highly questionable.
C.

Restrictive Covenants

Another important method the white majority has used to force
minorities into a subordinate position in society has been through
racially restrictive covenants.6 4 These legal devices in deeds of land
typically prohibited the sale or lease of property to persons of a
particular race, religion, or national origin.6 5 These covenants
were developed to exclude minorities from white residential
areas.66 Mexican-Americans faced this invidious discrimination6 7
and took their struggle to the courts in at least two instances.
In Clifton v. Puente,68 plaintiffs contended that the Mexican-American defendant's title to property was invalid because a deed, which
was part of his chain of title, contained a restrictive covenant
prohibiting the sale or lease of property to "persons of Mexican
descent."6 9 Relying on Shelley v. Kraemer, then a recently decided
case, the court held that denying the defendant title would amount
pleading standard was inconsistent with the liberal notice pleading require-

ment established by Rule 8(a) (2) and endorsed in Conley v. Gibson. Id. at 1163.
63 See FRIEDENTHAL, ET AL., supra note 60, at 256. Federal Rule 9 requires
detailed pleading of only a small number of specific matters-e.g., fraud. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 9. These matters were not at issue in Vigil
64 See D.O. McGovney, Racial Residential Segregationby State Court Enforcement
of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds isUnconstitutional 33
CAL. L. REv. 5, 37 (1945) (stating that racial residential restrictions "keep the
negro masses inferior").
65 See, e.g., Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868
(1945); Bogan v. Saunders, 71 F. Supp. 587 (D.D.C. 1947); Herb v. Gerstein,
41 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1941).
66 See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 348-49, 619, 624 (1972)
(documenting white citizen's and federal government's enforcement of
housing segregation using restrictive covenants that prohibited sale of
properties in "white areas" to African-Americans and other minorities).
67 See McGovney, supra note 64, at 15 (noting common exclusion of
Mexicans and persons of Mexican descent in Southwest); Greenfield & Kates,
supra note 4, at 716 (noting that Mexican-Americans, like African-Americans
and Asian-Americans, often confronted restrictive covenants when attempting
to buy or rent property).
68 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
69

Id. at 273.
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to enforcement of the
restrictive covenant in violation of the Four7°
teenth Amendment.
Mexican-Americans in California faced similar discrimination
through restrictive covenants. In Matthews v. Andrade,'1 the lower
court enjoined defendant Mexican-Americans from occupying land
subject to a restrictive covenant. The covenant prohibited "persons
of the Mexican race" from using or occupying the land.72 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that, under Shelley, court enforcement of the restrictive covenant was discriminatory
state action in
7
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These cases illustrate how the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley
constrained courts' discretion to rule against Mexican-Americans.
This is confirmed by the fact that both the Texas and California
courts had upheld restrictive covenants prior to Shelley.7 4

70 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, petitioner AfricanAmericans argued that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 78. In ruling for petitioners, the Supreme Court observed that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects only against state action. Thus, "restrictive agreements
standing alone" could not violate the petitioners' right to equal protection.
Id. at 13. The Court, however, held that judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive agreements constituted state action and a denial of equal
protection. Id. at 19-20; TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1697.
71 198 P.2d 66 (Cal. App. 1948).
72 Id. at 66.
73 Id.
74 See Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Gary, 186 P. 596 (Cal. 1919) (upholding
racially restrictive covenants); Liberty Annex Corp. v. City of Dallas, 289 S.W.
1067 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) (upholding racially restrictive convenant).
Interestingly, mainstream commentators have long regarded Shelley as
"unprincipled." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 259 (1985);
see, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 329-32 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting);
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 29, 31 (1959). See generally Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for
a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962) (arguing that Shelley should be
given limited reading, and that new qualifications should be developed
regarding state responsibility for discrimination). For example, Herbert
Wechsler has argued that Shelley was an "ad hoc" determination of a narrow
problem. See Wechsler, supra, at 31. In his view, the Court failed to articulate
a neutral principle that would explain why the enforcement of the covenant
amounted to state discrimination rather than a legal recognition of the
freedom of the individual. See id. at 29.
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D. Racial Slurs

Minorities also have been the subject of racial or ethnic slurs.7 5
Such slurs are yet another device the majority has used to exclude
certain groups and perpetuate their inferior status. Mexican-Americans have suffered this psychological abuse and have challenged it
in the courts.7 6
In Contrerasv. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,77 a Mexican-American sued
his employer for the tort of outrage. 78 Defendant's employees continuously had subjected plaintiff to racial jokes and slurs. Plaintiff
alleged that this conduct amounted to the tort of outrage. 79 The

trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim.8"

The

Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that plaintiff had
stated a claim for the tort of outrage. 8'
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court took a position
against psychological abuse directed against Mexican-Americans.8 2
Although the court reached a positive result for Mexican-Americans, legal precedents did not dictate this result. Prior to Contreras,
the court had allowed a husband to assert a claim for the tort of

outrage in Grimsby v. Samson85 based on the allegation that his wife's
doctors had caused her death by abandoning her.8 4 The trial court
distinguished Grimsby by restricting it to its facts. Reading the case
narrowly, the trial court restricted the tort of outrage to situations
75 See generally Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name Calling,17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982).
76 See Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MicH. L. REv. 2320, 2332 (1989) (noting that "[r]acist hate messages,
threats, slurs, epithets, and disparagement" are communicated "on the street,
in schoolyards, in popular culture and in the propaganda of hate widely
distributed in this country"); see also Patricia J. Williams, Spirit Murdering the
Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointingas the Law's Response to Racism, 42
MIAMI L. REv. 127, 129 (1987) (describing harm from racist speech as "spirit
murder"); Delgado, supranote 75, at 165-81 (suggesting tort remedy for injury
from racist words).
77 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash. 1977).
78 Id. at 1174.

79 Id.

Id. at 1175.
81 Id. at 1177.
82 See Delgado, supra note 75, at 146 (proposing that racial insults cause
psychological harm to victim because racial slurs evoke and intensify effects of
past "stigmatization, labeling, and disrespectful treatment").
83 530 P.2d 291 (Wash. 1975).
84 Id. at 292.
80
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where a third person, not the victim, brought the suit. 5 The Washington Supreme Court, however, construed Grimsby broadly to allow
the victim to recover. In addition, the court held for the first time
that the tort of outrage could be based on racial slurs.8 6 The court
reasoned that once-accepted racial slurs could not be characterized
as harmless insults.8

7

Thus, the court concluded that it was up to

the trier of fact to determine whether racial epithets constituted
extreme outrage.""
In Contreras,the Washington Supreme Court exercised its discretion in support of Mexican-Americans on two levels. First, the court
read Grimsby broadly to allow the recipient of conduct to assert a
claim for the tort of outrage. Significantly, the decision to read a
case narrowly or broadly is a matter of judicial discretion.8 9 Second, the court decided as a matter of first impression that racial
slurs could support a claim for the tort of outrage. The Contreras
court might easily have disallowed the claim. Other courts had
taken the position that such insults must be tolerated in our roughedged society and refused to allow racial slurs to support a cause of
action for outrage or the intentional infliction of emotional distress.9 ° Thus, the Contreras court's decision was not inevitable.
85
86

Contreras,565 P.2d at 1175.

Id.
Id.
88 Id.; see also Delgado, supra note 75, at 181 (arguing that independent tort
for racial slurs would safeguard interests of personality and equal citizenship,
87

and affirm right to live free of attacks on dignity and psychological integrity).
89 See POSNER, supra note 9, at 95. Judge Posner explains:

If, read as
Precedents can be read broadly or narrowly ....
narrowly as possible, a precedent dictates the decision of a later

case, that decision will be a decision based on precedent. If, read
that narrowly, the precedent does not control the later case, but
the court in the later case chooses to read the precedent more
broadly so that it will control, the key to the decision is precisely
that choice, a choice not dictated by precedent - a choice as to
what the precedent shall be. Once the choice has been made, the
precedent, viewed as authority rather than example, drops out of
the picture. There is no practical difference between on the one
hand treating a case as one of 'first impression,' and on the other

hand subsuming it under a previous case after first deciding as a
matter of discretion to read the previous case broadly enough to
enable the subsumption.

Id.
90 For example, in Bradshaw v. Swagerty, 563 P.2d 511 (Kan. App. 1977), an

African-American brought an action for the tort of outrage, based on the
allegation that defendant had called him a "nigger." Id. at 513. The court
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E. Summary

We have noted several cases dealing with the Mexican-American
litigation experience in the areas of public accommodations, land
grants, restrictive covenants, and ethnic slurs. They demonstrate
that Mexican-Americans have been faced with exclusion from public facilities, neighborhoods, and with racial slurs in a manner similar to the experience of African-Americans.9 1 Mexican-Americans
attempted to fight this discrimination in the courts. The cases
demonstrate that the resolution of key issues often was not inevitable. In this regard, the courts generally exercised discretion to rule
against Mexican-American efforts to desegregate public accommodations and to reclaim land. As to the effort to eliminate restrictive
covenants, the Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kramer constrained the discretion of the state courts to rule against MexicanAmericans. Finally, the Washington Supreme Court exercised its
discretion to protect Mexican-Americans against racial slurs.

held that these facts could not make out the tort of outrage, holding that "the
trial court was fully justified in regarding the epithets complained of here as
'mere insults' of the kind which must be tolerated in our rough-edged
society." Id. at 514; see also Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ill.
App. 1977) (holding that African-American customer was unable to recover
for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress where he was called
"arrogant nigger" by retail store employee).
91 Ironically, if this similar experience had been more widely recognized, at
least one interesting case might have come out differently. See, e.g., Davis v.
Meyer, 212 N.W. 435 (Neb. 1927). In Davis, a white woman claimed that
defendant defamed plaintiff by calling her a half-breed Mexican. The
Nebraska Supreme Court held that there could be no recovery because the
language used was not actionable per se. Id. at 436. The court ruled that the
words in question did not subject plaintiff to public ridicule, ignominy, or
disgrace. Id. It had been actionable per se to charge a white person with being
black because blacks were subject to social and legal discrimination such as
separate schools and separate public accommodations. Id. The court asserted
that Mexican-Americans did not face such restrictions. The court, therefore,
concluded that calling a person a "Mexican" could not "in any manner,
subject him to public ridicule, ignominy or disgrace." Id. Contrary to the
Nebraska Supreme Court's finding, there is substantial evidence that MexicanAmericans have been subjected to similar discrimination as that experienced
by blacks. Given this history, plaintiff should have prevailed in Davis. See infra
notes 92-268 and accompanying text (discussing segregation of MexicanAmericans in public schools).
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LITIGATION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: MEXICAN-AMERICAN
FIGHTS AGAINST SEGREGATION AND FOR BILINGUAL EDUCATION
A.

Fighting Segregation in the Public Schools

One of the most damaging manifestations of racial discrimination has been the segregation of minorities in the public schools.9"
It is well known that states commonly segregated African-Americans
in public schools.9" It is less widely acknowledged that MexicanAmericans have faced a similar obstacle in their effort to become
educated citizens.
1.

Litigation to Desegregate Public Schools, 1930-1969

a.

Segregation Not Authorized by Statute

In this era, all courts took the position, for various reasons, that
segregation of Mexican-Americans in public schools was permissible. The cases indicate that this position was not inevitable. One of
the key areas of legal indeterminacy in these early cases centers on
the question whether segregation of Mexican-Americans was permissible where it was not authorized by statute. The result of this

legal uncertainty is significant and instructive.
The first case to litigate this issue appears to be Independent School
94
District v. Salvatierra.
The city of Del Rio, Texas operated a "Mexi-

can" elementary school, that the city used exclusively for teaching
children of Mexican descent. No Texas statute 95 expressly authorized the segregation of Mexican-Americans. 9 6 Mexican-Americans
92 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (noting that
"[separating children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone"); Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150, 159 (1955)
(stating in 1955 that cruelty of segregation to African-American children was
"obvious and evident" for at least 20 years).
93 See Cahn, supra note 92, at 159; BELL, supra note 14, at 530-684.
94 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 580 (1931).
95 Texas statutes only authorized separate schools for white and black
children. See Act of April 1905, ch. 124, §§ 93-96, Gen. Laws of Tex. 263, 28889; Greenfield & Kates, supranote 4, at 682 n.92 (stating that Texas authorized
segregated schools for "'white and colored children' ... and defined 'colored
children' as 'all persons of mixed blood descended from Negro ancestry'").
96 The district superintendent explained that segregation was necessary
because many of the Mexican-American children were migrant farm workers
and worked far into the school term. See Salvatierra,33 S.W.2d at 792. The
district reasoned that segregation protected the morale of the students by
separating them from the Anglo children who would have had a four month
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sought to enjoin this segregation.9 7 The Texas Court of Civil
Appeals held that the school authorities could not arbitrarily segregate Mexican-American children solely because of ethnic background.9" The court, however, ruled that Del Rio was not
arbitrarily segregating these Mexican-American children. The
court found that the reasons the district gave for segregating the
children-linguistic difficulties and starting school late because of
migrant farm working-were sound if impartially applied to all children alike.9 9
This case is highly significant because it provided two justifications for segregating Mexican-American children. Specifically, the
district could segregate children because of linguistic difficulties or
because they were migrant farm workers. This case also presents us
with another example of legal indeterminacy. The Salvatierracourt
acknowledged that no other Texas court had yet addressed the
legality of segregating Mexican-Americans from other white
races.10 0 Given this vacuum, the court's decision disallowing racebased segregation for Mexican-Americans was not compelled. The
court could have followed other jurisdictions that allowed school
boards to segregate children on the basis of race, even without statutory authorization.11 Similarly, the court's conclusion that Mexiadvantage in their training. See id. The district also segregated the MexicanAmerican children because they had problems with the English language. Id.
Thus, the district claimed that its segregation was not based solely on race. Id.
Rather, the purpose of the system was to give a "fair opportunity of all children
alike" and to meet each group of children's "peculiar needs." Id. The district
admitted, however, that migrant Anglo students who entered school late were
not segregated into the Mexican school. Id. at 793.
97 Id. at 793-94.
98

Id. at 795.

Id. The court stated that "to the extent that the plan adopted is applied
in good faith ... with no intent ...to discriminate against any of the races
involved, it cannot be said that the plan is unlawful or violative even of the
spirit of the constitution." Id. Segregation would be unlawful only if "the rules
for the separation are arbitrary and are applied indiscriminately to all Mexican
pupils in those grades without apparent regard to their individual aptitudes
...while relieving children of other white races from the operation of the
rule." Id. The court refused to grant an injunction because it was not shown
that the school officials were at that time unlawfully segregating or intended to
do so in the future. Id.
100 Id. at 794.
101 See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1850)
(stating even in absence of express legislation, school board has discretion to
segregate). The Roberts decision was an important precedent in school
desegregation litigation. BELL,supra note 14, at 534. Indeed, Derrick Bell has
99
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can-Americans could be segregated for "benign reasons" was not
logically compelled. Because only Mexican-Americans were segregated for linguistic difficulties and migrant farm-working patterns, a0 2 the court might have found that, in effect, such
segregation was race-based and therefore illegal. Alternatively, the
court might have followed the reasoning of courts in otherjurisdictions which had held that, in the absence of express legislation, segregation was illegal.1"' As no legislation expressly authorized the
specific segregation at issue in Salvatierra,the court could have held
that segregation-even for linguistic or migrant farm worker reasons-was illegal.
Moreover, the court allowed the segregation to stand despite
clear evidence that the district practiced arbitrary segregation. For
example, white children who started school late were not placed in
the Mexican school.1 °4 Thus, the school board's assertion that it
segregated children in the Mexican school because they started
school late was a mere pretext. In addition, there were no tests
demonstrating that the Mexican-American children were less profi-

cient in English, the other alleged justification for the segregation.
In any event, the court did not consider the possibility that bilingual education might address any language problems better than
1 5
segregation. 0
pointed out that the P/essy decision relied heavily on Roberts. Id. at 537. Pessy
reasoned that "if school segregation was permissible in one of the states
'where the political rights of the colored race have been longest and most
earnestly enforced,' then segregation of public streetcars should be deemed
reasonable." Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 165 U.S. 537, 544 (1896)).
102 See Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d at 793 (stating that migrant Anglo students
who entered school late were not segregated into Mexican school).
105 See, e.g., Wysinger v. Crookshank, 23 P. 54, 56 (Cal. 1890) (finding that
school boards and personnel do not have power to segregate students without
state legislature granting that power); Rowles v. Board of Educ., 91 P. 88, 89
(Kan. 1907) (stating that in absence of express legislation, "no city or school
districts has any authority to discriminate against any child, or to deny it
admission to any public school thereof, on account of its color"); BELL, supra
note 14, at 536 (noting that some courts held "where local officials segregated
their schools without legislative authority, mandamus would lie ordering the
admission of black children to white schools").
104 Salvatierra,33 S.W.2d at 793. The district superintendent testified: "No,
I did not send any of those English speaking children who came in late over to
the school where I sent the Mexican or Spanish speaking children . . . ." Id.
105 See United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (ordering
bilingual/bicultural education to prevent segregation of Mexican-Americans),
aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1972); Rangel & Alcala, supra note 4, at 386 ("Most
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The Salvatierra court dealt a serious blow to the struggle to end
the segregation of Mexican-Americans. By the 1940's, the segregation of Mexican-Americans was widespread throughout the southwest, and school districts often justified it on the "benign" grounds
approved in Salvatierra.'0 6 There does not appear to be another
the issue anywhere until Westminster School District v.
case raising
7
Mendez.

10

In Mendez, Mexican-American children in California filed a petition for relief against officials of several school districts. District
officials had segregated the children into schools attended solely by
children of Mexican descent. The trial court held that the segregation violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights.' °8 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, distinguishing cases-including Plessy--in
which courts had upheld segregation based on legislative acts. ' °9
The court of appeals held that those cases were not controlling
because the California legislature had not authorized segregation
in Mendez. 0
Although the Mendez court reached a favorable result for the
Mexican-American plaintiffs, the case provides another illustration
that judicial decisions are often not compelled or inevitable. The
educators contend that the special needs of Mexican-American students can
be met through bilingual-bicultural programs."). Finally, this case is
remarkable because the court appears to be oblivious to the concerns of the
Mexican-American plaintiffs. In some striking passages, the court states:
[I]t is to the credit of both races that, notwithstanding widely
diverse racial characteristics, they dwell together in friendship,
peace, and unity, and work amicably together for the common
good and a common country .... [I]t is a matter of pride and
gratification in our great public educational system . . . that the

question of race segregation, as between Mexicans and other white
races, has not heretofore found its way into the courts of the state
Salvatierra, 33 S.W.2d at 794.

106 See Greenfield & Kates, supra note 4, at 711-14 ("Separate schools were
built and maintained, in theory, simply ...to benefit the Mexican child. He
had a 'language handicap' and needed to be 'Americanized' ...
JOAN W. MooRE, MExicAN AMERICANS 78 (1970)).
107
108

.)

(quoting

161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947).
Id. at 776.

109 Id. at 780.

110 See id. ("In the first place we are aware of no authority justifying any
segregation fiat by an administrative or executive decree as every case cited to
us is based upon a legislative act."); BELL, supra note 14, at 536 (stating that
some courts refused to allow local officials to segregate schools without
legislative authority).
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Mendez court gave a narrow reading to previous cases and held that

these cases authorized segregation only where the legislature had
mandated segregation. The court could have read these cases
broadly tojustify segregation imposed by administrative bodies such
as school boards but chose not to."'
The decision in Mendez, however, is not wholly favorable for Mexican-Americans. The court left open the possibility that MexicanAmericans could be segregated lawfully.

1

2

If California were to

enact a statute authorizing school boards to segregate MexicanAmericans, the case would not be distinguishable from the other

cases where the Supreme Court had upheld state laws providing for
segregation.' 13 Moreover, the court left open the possibility that
English language difficulties might justify segregating MexicanAmerican children absent statutory authorization." 4 That conclusion was questionable. Consistent with its insistence that legislation
must authorize segregation, the court might have taken the position that school districts could not justify segregation for linguistic
reasons without specific legislative authorization.
The next reported case involving segregation of Mexican-Americans arose in Arizona. In Gonzalez v. Sheely, 1' Mexican-Americans
sued officials of the Tolleson Elementary School District. The court
111 See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849)
(finding even in absence of express legislation, school board had discretion to
segregate). Indeed, the Mendez court expressly acknowledged that Roberts
allowed segregation that "was not founded directly upon a state statute."
Mendez, 161 F.2d at 779 n.6.
112 See Mendez, 161 F.2d at 781 (noting that California could legislatively
authorize this type of segregation).
"1
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana
segregation law on railroad cars); NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 619
(discussing cases upholding state laws authorizing segregation); Rangel &
Alcala, supra note 4, at 336 (analyzing court decisions based on state legislative
authority).
114 Mendez, 161 F.2d at 784. The court stated:
English language deficiencies of some of the children of Mexican
ancestry as such children enter elementary public school life as
beginners may justify differentiation by public school authorities
in the exercise of their reasonable discretion as to the pedagogical
methods of instruction to be pursued with different pupils, and
foreign language handicaps may be to such a degree in the pupils
in elementary schools as to require separate treatment in separate
classrooms.
Id.
115 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D. Ariz. 1951).
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found that defendants had segregated Mexican-American school
children into one school attended solely by Mexican-Americans. 16
The court determined that this segregation harmed the children's
ability to learn English and inhibited the development of a common cultural attitude thought to be essential to American public
life.' 7 Furthermore, the courtfound that the school district's segregation fostered antagonism in the children and wrongly suggested to them that they were inferior.""
Following the reasoning of Mendez, the court held that this segregation violated plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights." 9 The
court enjoined discriminatory practices against students of Mexican
descent where the legislature had not specifically authorized the
segregation. The court did leave open the possibility that English
language deficiencies might justify separate treatment in separate
classrooms.12 0 School districts, however, could institute separate
treatment lawfully only after a credible examination by the appropriate school officials.' 2 '
Gonzalez demonstrates how the Mendez court's exploitation of
legal indeterminacy to reach a conclusion favoring Mexican-Americans operated to constrain court discretion to rule against MexicanAmericans. Gonzalez also represents a significant advance over
Salvatierra. The Gonzalez court is far more sensitive to the plight of
the Mexican-American student than the court in Salvatierra. The
Gonzalez court, anticipating Brown v. Board of Education,'22 recognized that segregation placed a stamp of inferiority on MexicanAmericans and harmed their ability to learn English.'12 The Gonzalez court's conclusion that segregation generated a feeling of inferiority in Mexican-Americans is also significant for its rejection of the
notion in Plessy that legally compelled segregation did not stamp
116 Id. at 1006.
"7

Id. at 1007.

118 Id.

119 See id. at 1005 (stating that "[t]he principle established in Westminster
School District of Orange County v. Mendez . . . appears to be controlling").
120 Id. at 1009 (noting that "English language deficiencies of some of the
children of Mexican ancestry ... may exist to such a degree in the pupils in
elementary schools as to require separate treatment in separate classrooms").
121
122

Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

Cf id. at 494 (finding that segregation creates enduring feelings of
inferiority "that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone"); see also Rangel & Alcala, supra note 4, at 338 n.182.
123
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minorities with a badge of inferiority.124 The Salvatierracourt was
oblivious to such concerns. Nevertheless, the legacy of Salvatierra
remains. Gonzalez does not foreclose the possibility ofjustifying segregation of Mexican-Americans on the basis of language difficulties.
That notion, however, is inconsistent with the court's concern
about placing a stigma of inferiority on children. The court might
have taken the position that school districts could not justify segregation even for linguistic reasons because it places a stamp of inferiority on Mexican-Americans. 1 25 Evidently, the court did not
consider another possible solution to the problems: bilingual education without segregation.' 2 6
b.

Brown v. Board of Education

Three years after Gonzalez, the Supreme Court decided the
landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education.12 7 In Brown, AfricanAmericans sought to enjoin enforcement of state statutes that
required or permitted the segregation of African-American children in public schools. Plaintiffs alleged that such segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court found that segregation of children in public
schools on the basis of race deprived the children of equal educational opportunities 128 and generated lasting feelings of inferiority."2 The Court further held that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Sepa124 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("If [segregation makes
minorities feel inferior], it is not because of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.");
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 618 (stating that P/essy found that
segregation did not identify African-Americans as inferior and that laws could
not overcome social prejudice).
125 See United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 28 (E.D. Tex. 1971)
(refusing to allow segregation of Mexican-Americans because of linguistic
difficulties to prevent creating stigma of inferiority).
126 See supra note 105 and infra notes 269-98 (discussing bilingual
education).
127 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see BELL, supra note 14, at 544 ("As with other
landmark cases, the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Educationhas taken on a life of its own, with meaning and significance beyond
its facts and perhaps greater than its rationale."); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518,
518 (1980) (stating that Brown "triggered a revolution in civil rights law").
128 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493, 495.
129 Id. at 494.
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rate educational facilities are inherently unequal." is° Thus, segregation in public schools amounted to a denial of equal
protection.1 3 1
After Brown, the first Mexican-American desegregation case to
reach the courts arose in California. In Romero v. Weakly,' 3 2 Mexican-Americans filed an action against officials of the El Centro
School District. At defendants' request, 'the federal district court
3 4
exercised its discretion"3 3 to abstain under the Pullman doctrine.
The federal court sent the case into the state courts to have questions of state law resolved prior to adjudicating the constitutionality
of the school district's actions.' 3 5 The Ninth Circuit Court of
130 Id. at 495; see TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1480 (stating that Brown abolished
"odious .. .'separate but equal'" doctrine)
131 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. Derrick Bell has observed that Brown brought
about a social upheaval and "transformed blacks from beggars pleading for
decent treatment to citizens demanding equal treatment under the law as
their constitutionally recognized right." Bell, supra note 127, at 518. Despite
these effects, some legal scholars questioned the validity of Brown's reasoning.
See, e.g., Wechsler, supranote 74, at 34 (questioning whether neutral principle
could be found to support holding in Brown). For responses to Wechsler, see
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960); Ira M. Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation and the Friendly

Critics, 49 CAL. L. REV. 104 (1961); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and
Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
132

131 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Cal.), rev'd, 226 F.2d 399 (9th Cir. 1955).

133

Pullman abstention is discretionary.

ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY,

FEDERAL

JURISDCrION 603 (1989).
'34 See Railroad Comm'n

of Tex. v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941)
(providing substance and rationale of Pullman abstention doctrine). In
Pullman, the Supreme Court held that "where state law is uncertain and a
clarification of state law might make a federal court's determination of a
constitutional question unnecessary," the federal court may "abstain until the
state court has had an opportunity to resolve the uncertainty as to state law."
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 133, at 595; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL

JURIsmCFON: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER

282 (2d ed.

1990) (stating that Pullman abstention doctrine cautions federal courts against
adjudicating constitutionality of ambiguous state laws until state courts have
had a reasonable opportunity to consider their constitutionality) (citing
Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 176 (1959)). The Pullman abstention
doctrine serves the goals of avoiding premature constitutional adjudication
and interference with important state functions. See REDISH, supra, at 282;
Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
135 Defendants argued that state courts had to apply and construe local law
before the federal court could reach any constitutional questions. The district
court dismissed the case on that basis, ruling that California courts had to
ascertain and construe state law regarding the school authorities' policies
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Appeals reversed, ruling that there was no unclear question of state
law that might justify the use of the Pullman abstention doctrine." 6
The court further observed that plaintiffs might have concluded
that there was a greater chance that they would receive justice in
the federal courts than in the state courts because the state judge is
elected and the federal judge is appointed for life.1 1 7 Finding the
Pullman abstention doctrine inapplicable, the Ninth Circuit
1 38
ordered the district court to hear the case.
The district court's exercise of discretion was obviously not inevitable and is open to serious criticism. When the district court
employed the abstention doctrine, it sent the case into a forum generally thought to enforce federal constitutional rights less vigorously, 139 and where Mexican-Americans had not fared well. 4 °
Moreover, the abstention doctrine has been heavily criticized for
imposing significant delay and expense on parties forced into state
court for a determination of state law issues.1 4 ' This delay might
moot the issues or so frustrate the plaintiffs that they abandon the
litigation altogether. Thus, an abstention order may doom the
suit. 14 2 For these reasons, and for the reasons stated by the Ninth
Circuit, the district court's decision to abstain was highly
questionable.
The first case to be decided on the merits after Brown was Hernandez v. Driscoll ConsolidatedIndependent School District.14 3 MexicanAmericans claimed that the defendant school district violated their
constitutional rights by maintaining separate classrooms for children of Mexican descent in the first and second grades and by
requiring a majority of the children to spend three years in the first
before the court could determine a constitutional violation. Romero, 226 F.2d
at 401-02.
136
137
138

Id.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 402.

Neubome, supra note 50, at 1105-06.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing state courts' failure
to vigorously enforce federal civil rights).
141 Martha Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1085 (1974); see also REDISH, supra
note 134, at 283; NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 98 (noting that
abstention doctrine creates additional expense and delay for parties forced to
return to state courts).
142 Field, supra note 141, at 1086.
143 2 Race Rel. L. Rptr. 329 (S.D. Tex. 1957).
139

140

19941

Mexican-American Litigation Experience

grade before promotion to the second grade. 4 4 Following Salvatierraand Mendez, the court held that segregation of Mexican-Americans was permissible so long as the classification was not
arbitrary.1 4 5 Specifically, the court held that language handicaps
could justify segregation into separate classrooms, but only after a
credible examination of each child by the appropriate school official.' 4 6 The district had failed to administer language tests, thus the
court determined that the segregation constituted arbitrary and
unreasonable race discrimination.147
The decision could have gone another way. First, the court
might have read Brown to prohibit the segregation of MexicanAmerican children even for language difficulties.' 48 Instead, it followed two pre-Brown cases without even discussing whether Brown
might have overruled those earlier cases. Second, there was expert
testimony that the best way to address the language difficulties was
to group all children together regardless of their language ability. 14 9 The court, nonetheless, chose to permit linguistic problems
to justify segregation. It took this position despite clear evidence
that school officials used the linguistic rationale as a pretext for segregating Mexican-Americans from Anglos. If the district was truly
concerned about the language difficulties of its Mexican-American
144 Id. at 329.
Defendants denied that they were discriminating on the
basis of race and argued that it was necessary to separate the children who
could not speak English into separate classrooms. Id. at 331.

145

Id. at 333.

146

Id.

Id. at 332. Plaintiffs, however, did not receive an immediate injunction.
Id. at 333. The injunction was not to take effect until the beginning of the
next school term. Id.
148 See United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 869 (5th Cir.
1972) (acknowledging that Brown did not permit linguistic difficulties or other
benign justifications for segregating Mexican-Americans).
149 See Gonzalez v. Sheely, 96 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 (D. Ariz. 1951) ("Spanish
speaking children are retarded in learning English by lack of exposure to its
use because of segregation, and commingling of the entire student body
instills and develops a common cultural attitude among the school children
which is imperative for the perpetuation of American institutions and
ideals."); Jeffrey W. Kobrick, A Model Act Providingfor Transitional Bilingual
Education Programs in Public Schools, 9 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 260, 281 (1972)
(stating that isolating non-English speakers from English speakers discourages
learning of English); Terri L. Newman, Comment, Proposal" Bilingual
Education Guidelinesfor the Courts and the Schools, 33 EMORY LJ. 577, 606 (1984)
(asserting that segregating children with limited English proficiency hinders
their learning of English because they do not hear conversational English
spoken).
147
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students, it would have administered language tests to assess the students' levels of English proficiency. Most telling, however, is the
district's refusal to admit a Mexican student to the Anglo school
even though she spoke no Spanish. 5 '
c.

Summary

In the years between 1930 and 1969, Mexican-Americans were
segregated in public schools in Arizona, California, and Texas. The
cases demonstrate that rulings on key issues often were not inevitable. Courts often exercised discretion to reach their conclusions.
In this era, courts exercised their discretion to conclude that, at
least under certain circumstances, segregation of Mexican-Americans was justifiable. The courts took this position in both pre-Brown
and post-Brown cases. This proved to be an omen. In later years,
courts tended to find ways to permit segregated schools for Mexican-Americans.
2.

Litigation to Desegregate Public Schools, 1970-1980: Legal
Indeterminacy and De Facto Versus De Jure
Segregation

In the 1970's Mexican-Americans again took to the courts
attempting to fulfill the promise of Brown by putting an end to the
segregation of Mexican-American children. Early on, MexicanAmericans had to deal with court discretion. In Alvarado v. El Paso
Independent School District,'' Mexican-Americans filed a class action
seeking to desegregate the El Paso schools. The district court dismissed the case on the pleadings, finding that plaintiffs had failed
52
to allege specific facts to support their claim of discrimination.'
Significantly, the district court cited no authority to support the
requirement of specific fact pleading. 5 '
Hernandez is the last
150 Hernandez, 2 Race Rel. L. Rptr. at 331.
desegregation case from this time period. There are no published decisions
involving Mexican-American efforts to desegregate schools during the 1960s.
This is not surprising. In the view of one commentator, "from 1955 to 1968,
the [Supreme] Court abandoned the field of public school desegregation." J.
HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM Brown to Bakke 61 (1979).
151 326 F. Supp. 674 (W.D. Tex.), rev'd, 445 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
152 Id. at 675 (holding that plaintiffs have no right to institute class action
where they have not alleged any specific act of discrimination).
153 See id.
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The district court's decision was highly questionable. As discussed above,1 54 in general, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court,1 55 do not require specific fact
pleading. Thus, the district court should not have dismissed the
complaint for failure to allege specific acts of discrimination. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
complaint adequately stated a claim under the Federal Rules notice
pleading requirement. 5 6
From 1970-1980, courts found a new way to uphold the segregation of Mexican-Americans. In many cases, courts took the position
that the Federal Constitution prohibited only dejure (intentionally
caused) segregation 15 7 as opposed to de facto segregation. 15 During this period of Mexican-American civil rights litigation, the
major areas of legal indeterminacy focused on whether (1) only de
jure segregation was prohibited by the Federal Constitution; (2)
whether the Constitution permitted benign justifications for Mexican-American segregation; and (3) if de jure segregation was
required to prove unconstitutional segregation, whether "intent"
should be determined under an objective standard. The cases, considered in chronological order below, are categorized for discussion purposes into three groups: (1) those decided prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Keyes v. School District No. 1;159 (2)
those that were decided after Keyes, but prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,1 6 and (3) those decided
after Washington v. Davis. The cases indicate that the courts
exploited legal uncertainty in these areas to reach their
conclusions.
See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 59-62 (discussing Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule
8(a) in Conley).
156 Alvarado v. El Paso Indep. Sch. Dist., 445 F.2d 1011, 1011 (5th Cir.
1971).
157 See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 635 ("De jure ('by law')
segregation is racial separation which is the product of some purposeful act by
government authorities.").
158 See id. ("De facto ('by the facts') segregation occurs because of housing
and migration patterns and is unconnected to any purposeful governmental
action to racially segregate schools."); Seth F. Kreimer, Note, Reading the Mind
of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86
YALE L.J. 317, 317 (1976) (stating that dejure segregation arises from "explicit
assignment of pupils on the basis of race" whereas de facto segregation arises
from "causes other than race-conscious action").
159 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
165 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
154
155
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a. Litigation Priorto Keyes v. School District No. 1
With respect to Mexican-Americans, the question of de jure segregation was first addressed in People v. San Diego Unified School District.16 1 The State of California sought to force the school district to

eliminate racial imbalance in its schools. 162 In finding for plaintiffs,
the court noted that a majority of courts had held that a state did
not have an affirmative federal constitutional duty to relieve racial
imbalance in its schools that were not the result of de jure segregation.1 63 The court observed, however, that a minority of courts had
held that states had a federal constitutional duty, where de facto
segregation existed, to remedy the racial imbalance." 6 Relying on
what it recognized to be dicta in two prior California Supreme
Court decisions, the court eliminated the de jure/de facto distinction, holding that, as a matter of California law, school authorities
had a "constitutional duty to 'take steps, insofar as reasonably feasible, to alleviate racial imbalance in schools'" whether it stemmed
from de jure or de facto segregation.' 65
San Diego is an example of a case where the court exercised its
discretion in favor of Mexican-Americans. Since earlier cases
merely stated in dicta that de facto segregation violated California
law, the San Diego court was not bound by those cases.' 6 By requir161

96 Cal. Rptr. 658 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).

A survey demonstrated that the Mexican-American pupil population
was 10.1% of the total student population in the district. Id. at 661. Yet, in
162

one elementary school, the Mexican-American student population exceeded
50% of the total population in the school. Id. The district refused to take
steps to eliminate the racial imbalance. Id. The State alleged that the district
was denying students attending these schools an equal educational
opportunity. Id.
163 Id. at 663 (citing, e.g., Banks v. Muncie Community Sch., 433 F.2d 292,
294 (7th Cir. 1970); Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 423 F.2d 121, 122
(2d Cir. 1970)). Those courts held that assigning students according to a
neighborhood school attendance policy not intended to create or perpetuate
racial imbalance, but that nonetheless caused an imbalance, was not
unconstitutional; although state action, it was merely de facto segregation. Id.
164 San Diego, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 664 (citing, e.g., Kelley v. Metropolitan County
Bd. of Educ., 317 F. Supp. 980, 986 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Spangler v. Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 501, 522 (C.D. Cal. 1970)).
165 Id. at 666 (quotingJackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878, 882
(1963)).
166 SeeJOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 261 (2d
ed. 1921) The author notes:

[A]t the Common Law not every opinion expressed by a judge
forms ajudicial Precedent. In order that an opinion may have the
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587

ing school districts to remedy racial imbalance caused by de facto
segregation, the court made challenging desegregation easier for
Mexican-Americans. In future cases, they would not be faced with
the difficult task of proving
that the school officials intended to seg16 7
regate the students.
San Diego also highlights a key issue in the school desegregation
cases: whether or not de facto segregation offends the Federal Constitution. Some commentators argue that Brown held de facto segregation unconstitutional when it declared separate educational
facilities inherently unequal."6 They contend that the constitutional evil was not the government's intention to segregate AfricanAmericans, but rather the "harmful psychological and educational
effects" of isolating minorities from whites in schools the community regarded as inferior. 6 9 In their view, any state action that
brings about
these effects violates the principle for which Brown
70
stands.'

These cases reveal that some courts chose to read Brown narrowly
to bar only de jure segregation when they could have read the case
broadly to bar de facto segregation. As of 1976, the Supreme Court
weight of a precedent, two things most occur: it must be, in the
first place, an opinion given by ajudge, and, in the second place, it
must be an opinion the formation of which is necessary for the
decision of a particular case; in other words it must not be obiter
dictum.
Id.

167 See BELL, supra note 14, at 561 n.18 (describing requirement that
plaintiffs prove intentional segregation as a formidable obstacle); Kreimer,
supra note 158, at 325 (noting that proving subjective intent poses serious
evidentiary difficulties).
168 See Frank I. Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and

EmpiricalAnalysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 277 (1972); Kreimer, supra note 158, at
118. See generally, James R. Dunn, Title VI, the Guidelines and School Desegregation
in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42, 67-69 (1967); Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in
PublicSchools: The ConstitutionalConcepts, 78 HAv. L. REv. 564 (1965); J. Skelly
Wright, Public School Desegregation - Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation, 40
N.Y.U. L. REv. 285 (1965). But compare Moses v. Washington Parish Sch. Bd.,
276 F. Supp. 834, 841 (E.D. La. 1967) and Lynch v. Kensten Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 229 F. Supp. 740, 742 (N.D. Ohio 1964), which refuse to read Brown as
holding de facto segregation unconstitutional.
169 Goodman, supra note 168, at 277; Kreimer, supra note 158, at 318 ("A
second line of authority, however, focused on the proposition in Brown that
'separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.' It argued that racial
separation, and not the method by which that separation came about, was the
evil condemned by Brown.").
170 Id.
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had yet to squarely face the question of whether de facto segregation was unlawful. 17 ' Apparently, prior to that time, courts that
required a showing of de jure segregation could have required only
a showing of de facto segregation. In any event, courts resisted
prohibiting de facto segregation. Thus, San Diego is especially noteworthy because it involved a California state court staking out a progressive position on the de facto segregation issue.
Federal courts in Texas also addressed the de jure/de facto distinction. In United States v. Midland Independent School District,1 72 the
United States alleged that the Midland School District assigned children to schools based on race. Although the district's desegregation plan concentrated Mexican-American children into one
elementary school, the district court approved the plan. 17 , The
court reasoned that the concentration of Mexican-Americans was
not the result of de jure segregation and, therefore, was not unconstitutional.1 4 The plan did not assign children to neighborhood
schools according to race, but rather on the basis of neighborhood
zoning arrangements. 175 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the facts showed that the school board's pri-

Several courts acknowledged that the constitutionality of de facto
segregation was an open question. See, e.g., Oliver v. Michigan St. Bd. of Educ.,
508 F.2d 178, 181 n.3 (6th Cir. 1974); Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F. Supp. 904, 912
n.10 (W.D.N.Y. 1976); Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 33 (Cal.
1976); cf Ybarra v. City of San Jose, 503 F.2d 1041, 1042-43 & n.2 (9th Cir.
1974) (stating that open question is whether racial imbalance inherent in
neighborhood school policy [de facto segregation] is unconstitutional in
absence of de jure segregation).
172 334 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 519 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1975).
173 Id. at 152.
174 Id. at 151. The court stated that "[t]here has never been any de jure
segregation of Mexican-American children and there has never been a dual
system involving Mexican-Americans." Id.
175 Id. at 149. The court determined that the concentration of MexicanAmericans was not caused by state action, but by economic factors and the
Mexican-Americans' desire to living in a predominately Mexican-American
neighborhood rather than in predominantly white neighborhoods. Id. at 150.
The court held that "[a] school district has no affirmative obligation to achieve
a balance of the races in the schools when the existing imbalance is not
attributable to school policies . . . and is the result of housing patterns and
other forces over which the school administration had no control." Id. at 150.
Moreover, the court expressed its preference for neighborhood schools,
suggesting that abolishing neighborhood schools for young children would be
unproductive. Id. at 151.
171
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mary objective was to segregate Mexican-Americans. 176 Because the
court of appeals found intent to segregate, there was no need to
consider whether de facto segregation was permissible.
The district court's conclusion in Midland that the school district
had no affirmative obligation to remedy de facto segregation was
not logically compelled. Because the Supreme Court's decisions
had left open the question of whether de facto segregation violated
the Constitution, 1 77 and the Fifth Circuit did not require a showing
of discriminatory intent at the time of the decision, 7 1 the district
court could have rejected the dejure/de facto distinction. In addition, the district court could have barred the segregation for the
reasons stated by the court of appeals - namely, that discriminatory intent was present. Instead, Mexican-Americans had to wait
four years to be vindicated.' 79 This case is noteworthy because the
district court was unsympathetic to plaintiffs' cause.' ° In many of
176 United States v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir.
1975). The record clearly showed that the district deliberately segregated
Mexican-Americans. Id. at 62. In 1912, the school board resolved to provide a
separate school for Mexican-Americans which operated until the 1940's. Id.
The Mexican school of the present day district had always been an all Mexican
school. Id. Mexican-Americans were bused to the school, and Anglos living
near the school were sent elsewhere. Id. Finally, the neighborhood school
zone for the Mexican school exactly covered "Mexican Town." Id. at 63. The
totality of these facts showed segregative intent on the part of the district. Id.
177 See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 168, at 275-76. In 1972 Goodman stated
that the
problem of defacto segregation-racial imbalance resulting merely
from adherence to the traditional, racially neutral, neighborhood
school policy in a community marked by racially segregated
residential patterns-has yet to be faced. On this issue, the
Supreme Court has kept tight-lipped silence, denying certiorari in
several cases squarely presenting the issue.
Id.; see also Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 33 (Cal. 1976) (acknowledging that whether de facto segregation violated Federal Constitution was
open question); supra note 171 (listing other cases addressing same issue).
178 See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 467 F.2d 142, 150 (5th
Cir. 1972) ("While there is admittedly no catholicity of viewpoints in the
Circuits on the question of intentional state action, this Court has never
tempered its prohibition of school board actions that create, maintain or
foster segregation by the requirement that a discriminatory intent be

shown.").
179 See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text (discussing reversal of
district court decision).
180 See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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these cases, plaintiffs had to rely on the circuit court to uphold
their rights.
In Tasby v. Estes,"1 Mexican-Americans sought to desegregate the
Dallas Independent School District. The district court ruled against
plaintiffs on the ground that they had failed to establish de jure
segregation.18 2 Without addressing the validity of the de jure/de
facto distinction, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding sufficient evidence to establish dejure segregation.1 3 The district court's decision in Tasby was questionable. As discussed, the
court could have found that even de facto segregation was
impermissible.
Turning to the second major area of legal indeterminacy, in
United States v. Texas the court addressed the question whether
benign reasons, such as linguistic difficulties, could justify segregation of Mexican-Americans.18 4 The court held that the Del Rio
school district (the same district that had been the defendant in
Salvatierra) intentionally segregated Mexican-American students.1 i 5
To bring about "true integration" and to "avoid the creation of a
stigma of inferiority akin to the badges and incidents of slavery," the
court ordered bilingual and bicultural education for Anglos and
Mexican-Americans thereby ensuring that everyone received equal
educational opportunities." 6 Thus, the court barred segregation
of the Mexican-American children into separate classrooms or
schools because of linguistic difficulties.
181 342 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1975).
182

Id. at 948.

Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92, 106 (5th Cir. 1975).
184 United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971). In ordering
the desegregation of the San Felipe del Rio School District, the court held that
Mexican-American students were a cognizable ethnic group and, hence, were
entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection. Id. at 24.
185 Id. In creating a remedy, the court exhibited unusual sensitivity. The
court suggested that special educational consideration be given to students "in
assisting them in adjusting to those parts of their new school environment
which present a cultural and linguistic shock." Id. at 28.
186 Id. As one commentator has noted, the court's conclusion that
desegregation required bilingual and bicultural education was sound;
attempting to solve linguistic difficulties by segregating Mexican-Americans
into separate classrooms "would defeat the purposes of desegregation."
Stephen G. Sneeringer, Comment, Bilingual-BiculturalEducation in Texas, 7
URnB. L. ANN. 400, 405 (1974). Thus, "[iun a desegregated atmosphere where
bilingualism is utilized, education in the minority culture furthers
desegregation." Id. at 406.
183
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One of the most significant and positive opinions to be rendered
on the issue of Mexican-American segregation, United States v. Texas,
was not, however, inevitable. The courts in Salvatierra,Mendez, Gonzalez, and Hernandez permitted school districts to segregate Mexican-American children to deal with English language problems.
Thus, there was ample authority for the court to have adopted that
position. Instead, the court recognized that resorting to segregation placed a stigma of inferiority on the children. The court also
understood that bilingual education provided a remedy without
such segregation. As a result, the court took a step toward eliminating that most stubborn ofjustifications for the segregation of Mexican-Americans, namely, difficulties with the English language.
Cisneros v. Corpus ChristiIndependent School District18 7 is a landmark
case dealing with the de jure/de facto distinction. Plaintiffs
brought a class action against the Corpus Christi School District to
desegregate the public schools. The district court held that the
city's segregation of Mexican-American children was illegal.' 88 On
review, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that this was a
novel school desegregation case because the segregation of Mexican-Americans in Corpus Christi had never been mandated by
Texas statute.1 89 The court held that, although Brown had dealt
with statutory segregation, unlawful segregation extended beyond
statutorily mandated segregation and included actions and policies
of school authorities. 190 The court directly addressed the issue of
de jure versus de facto segregation' 9' and read Brown as requiring
467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 144. The court ordered the school district to immediately
reassign its teaching staff and implement a student reassignment plan to
integrate the school system. Id.
189 Id. The court acknowledged that this case raised a new issue which had
not been present in the black/white dual systems: whether the non-statutory
segregation of Mexican-Americans was constitutionally permissible. Id.
190 Id. at 147. The court announced that dual school systems were not
more tolerable because they developed without legislative insistence; the
state's endorsement was nonetheless apparent. Id. at 148. The continuing
effort to characterize this as de facto segregation and beyond the court's
authority to remedy was "no longer entitled to serious consideration." Id.
191 The court determined that, since 1938, the district had assigned Anglo
and Mexican-American children to schools according to a neighborhood
school plan composed of geographic attendance zones. Id. at 146. This plan,
given residential segregation, resulted in the segregation of MexicanAmericans from Anglos in the public schools. Id. The trial court found that
de jure segregation existed in the city and that Mexican-Americans had been
unconstitutionally segregated in the public schools. Id. at 147. On appeal, the
187
188
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plaintiffs to establish only that action by the school board resulted
in a segregated system.' 9 2 Plaintiffs did not have to prove a discriminatory purpose.1 93 Thus, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's finding that the board had illegally segregated Mexican94
Americans. 1
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Cisneros is important because it
flatly rejected the dejure/de facto distinction in requiring plaintiffs
to establish only that state action resulted by segregation.' 95 While
the court acknowledged that other courts insisted on a showing of a
discriminatory purpose to find unconstitutional segregation, it
refused to accept their view.' 9 6 Thus, Cisneros confirms that the
choice made by other courts to require dejure segregation to establish unconstitutional segregation was not inevitable.
The Fifth Circuit finally disposed of the argument that benign
reasons could justify segregation of Mexican-Americans in United
States v. Texas Education Agency.' 9 7 The United States filed a suit
against the Austin Independent School District and the Texas Eduboard argued that this segregation was not the result of board action, but
rather of housing patterns. Id. at 148. Moreover, the board argued that even
if the segregation were the result of board action, there would be no
constitutional violation. Id. at 150. The board contended that plaintiffs had
not shown that the board had acted with a discriminatory purpose, a showing
required to demonstrate de jure segregation. Id.
192 Id. The court stated:
Brown prohibits segregation in public schools that is the result of
state action. It requires simply the making of two distinct factual
determinations to support a finding of unlawful segregation. First,
a denial of equal educational opportunity must be found to exist,
defined as racial or ethnic segregation. Secondly, this segregation
must be the result of state action.
Id.
193 Id. at 149-50. The court stated that it had consistently prohibited school
boards from instituting or perpetuating segregation without requiring
plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent. Id. The court noted that "[s]chool
cases serve to emphasize the correctness of this principle, for regardless of
motive, the children that suffer from segregation suffer the same deprivation
of educational opportunity that Brown condemns." Id.
194 Id. at 144-45. Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
ruling, it changed the remedy by minimizing the use of busing in the
desegregation plan. Id. at 152.
195 Id. at 150.
196 Id.

197 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
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cation Agency alleging unlawful segregation.19 The district court
held that there had been no de jure segregation against the Mexican-Americans." 9 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court had applied an erroneous legal standard. The court
explained that when a discriminatory effect was present, it was not
necessary to prove a discriminatory purpose in order to establish an
Equal Protection violation.20 0
This case is significant because the court found that Brown did
not permit the old justifications for segregating Mexican-Americans: English language problems and migrant labor difficulties.20 1
Thus, the Fifth Circuit rejected the view of other post-Brown courts
that had approved segregation for benign reasons. 20 2 It is remarkable that these justifications were still being offered in defense of
segregation more than forty years after they were first accepted by
the Salvatierra court. It is perhaps more remarkable that it took
forty years before the Fifth Circuit finally rejected these "benign
justifications" for the segregation of Mexican-Americans.
Finally, in Arvizu v. Waco Independent School District,20 3 Mexican-

Americans sought to desegregate the Waco Independent School
District. Following Cisneros, the court acknowledged that two find198 Id. at 853. The complaint charged that Mexican-Americans were
assigned to schools that were identifiable as Mexican-American schools and
were attended almost exclusively by Mexican-American and African-American
students. Id.
199 Id. at 854.

Id. at 864-65. Plaintiffs must prove only that the natural and foreseeable
consequence of the board's actions was the segregation of MexicanAmericans. Id. at 863-64. In this case, school authorities assigned children to
schools by choosing sites for and constructing new schools, and drawing
attendance zone lines. Id. at 863. The court found that the "natural and
foreseeable" effect of these actions was the segregation of Mexican-Americans.
200

Id.
201

Id. at 868-69. In defense, the school district raised a strikingly familiar

argument. It claimed that segregation of Mexican-Americans was justified

because they needed extra help and attention. Id. at 868. The MexicanAmerican children suffered English language difficulties, and they were
children of migrant labor families who arrived at school late in the fall
semester. Id. at 868-69. The court was not convinced that separate schools
were necessary to meet the special educational needs of Mexican-American
children. Id. at 869. The court cautioned that "[a] benign motive will not
excuse the discriminatory effects of the school board's actions." Id.
202 See, for example, Hernandez v. Driscoll Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 2
Race Rel. L. Rptr 329 (1957), a post-Brown case approving segregation for
benign purposes.
203 373 F. Supp. 1264 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd, 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974).
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ings were needed to support a finding of unlawful segregation: (1)
the "denial of equal education opportunity... defined as racial or
ethnic segregation," and (2) segregation resulting from state
action. 20 4 Purporting to apply Cisneros, the court held that plaintiffs
"failed to show the necessary history of official discrimination or
official acts with the inevitable consequence of creating segregation
to justify a finding that the concentration of Mexican-American students in certain schools is the result of state action."205 According
to the court, "residential patterns," not state action, caused the
segregation. 206
The decision of the Arvizu court is questionable. In Cisneros, the
Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the Corpus Christi School District's
argument that segregation in that case was only the result of "housing patterns" and not state action.2 °7 The Cisneros court held that
where a neighborhood school plan is applied in the context of
marked residential segregation, producing inevitable segregation in
the schools, then such segregation is the result of state action. 0 8 In
Arvizu, the school district employed a "'neighborhood school' concept " 2 09 in the context of a pattern of Mexican-American residential
segregation.21° Thus, in Arvizu, the neighborhood school plan proId. at 1268.
Id. at 1269.
206 Id. at 1268-69 (stating conclusively that concentration of MexicanAmericans in certain schools was result of residential housing patterns).
207 Cisneros, 467 F.2d at 148. In response to the school district's argument
that the segregation was merely the result of housing patterns and did not
constitute de jure segregation, the Cisneros court stated that "[w]e must...
reject this type of continued meaningless use of de facto and de jure
nomenclature to attempt to establish a kind of ethnic and racial separation of
students in public schools that federal courts are powerless to remedy." Id.
204
205

208 Id. at 149 ("[1]n our view the use of the neighborhood school plan is the
direct and effective cause of segregation in the schools of the city."). See also
Wright, supra note 168, at 296, stating:
Where a forthright effort is made to determine the cause of racial
imbalance, the probability of finding state action in segregated
Negro schools, in some degree at least, is increased immeasurably.
Discrimination in job opportunities, housing and other necessities
drives Negroes into the segregated slums, and application of the
neighborhood school policy seals their children in the slum school
which these children are compelled by law to attend ....
[T] he
legal compulsion to attend the segregated school should be
sufficient state action to bring all de facto segregation within the
rule of Brown.
209 Arvizu, 373 F. Supp. at 1267.
210

Id. at 1268.
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duced inevitable segregation in the schools.2 ' Given this, under
Cisneros, the court should have found state action sufficient to support a finding of unconstitutional segregation. Under these circumstances, the Arvizu court's insistence that there must be a
history of "official discrimination" to justify a finding of state action
seems to be an attempt to require a finding of purposeful segregation-a requirement that was. expressly rejected in Cisneros.
b. Litigation After Keyes v. School District No.1, But Prior to
Washington v. Davis
The next desegregation confrontation took place in Colorado.
In Keyes v. School District No. J.,112 a Mexican-American desegregation case finally reached the United States Supreme Court. The
interpretation of Keyes created another major area of legal
indeterminacy.
In Keyes, plaintiffs alleged that defendant school board was practicing de jure segregation. The Supreme Court held that the lower
courts had applied an incorrect legal standard in addressing plaintiffs' claim that the school board had an unconstitutional policy of
deliberate segregation. 21 ' The Court ruled that plaintiffs do not
bear the burden of proving the elements of de jure segregation as
to each and every school within the system. Rather, where plaintiffs
prove that school officials have carried out a program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the school system, this showing will be sufficient to establish that a dual school system exists.21 4
Id.
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
Id. at 198. Plaintiffs had proved at trial that defendants had an
unconstitutional policy of deliberately segregating Park Hill schools, one
segment of the Denver school district. Id. The district court held that this did
not impose an affirmative duty on the school board to desegregate throughout
the school district. Id. at 199-200. Rather, the district court required plaintiffs
to make a new showing of de jure segregation in each area of the city they
wanted desegregated. Id. at 198-200.
214 Id. at 200. The Court also held that a finding of intentional segregation
in a meaningful portion of the school system creates a presumption that other
segregation within the school system is intentional. Id. at 208. The finding
establishes a prima facie showing of the school officials' unlawful segregative
intent and shifts to those officials the burden of proving the other segregated
schools within the system are not the result of intentionally segregative
actions. Id. In discharging their burden, it is not enough for defendants to
rely on some allegedly neutral explanation for their actions; they must show
that segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions.
Id. at 210. For example, defendant argued that its neighborhood school
211
212
213
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Although the Keyes opinion contains references to de jure segregation, the Supreme Court never directly addressed the question of
whether de facto segregation was a constitutional violation.2 15 Prior
to the decision, commentators expected the Court to directly
address the question. 2 16 By declining to resolve the question, the
Supreme Court sustained the legal indeterminacy on the issue.
Thus, after Keyes, lower courts continued to be split on the issue and
often exploited the ambiguity in Keyes in reaching their decisions.
Five cases illustrate this point.
For example, in Soria v. Oxnard School District,2 17 Mexican-Ameri-

cans brought a desegregation suit against the Oxnard School Dispolicy explained the ethnic concentration within the core city schools. Id. at
211. In response, the Court stated that "the mere assertion of such a policy is
not dispositive where, as in this case, the school authorities have been found to
have practiced de jure segregation .

.

. by techniques that indicate that the

'neighborhood school' concept has not been maintained free of
manipulation." Id. at 212.
215 See id. ("[W]e have no occasion to consider in this case whether a
'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial or ethnic
concentrations in the absence of finding that school authorities have
committed acts constituting de jure segregation."); Arthur v. Nyquist, 415 F.
Supp. 904, 912 n.10 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Since the plaintiffs in Keyes pleaded
and proved de jure segregation, the Supreme Court was not forced to decide
whether merely proof of de facto segregation constitutes cognizable legal
wrong."); Zamora v. New Braunfels Indep. Sch. Dist., 362 F. Supp. 552, 557
(W.D. Tex. 1973) (recognizing that Keyes majority did not directly address
question whether to uphold dejure/de facto distinction), revd, 519 F.2d 1084
(5th Cir. 1975); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 33 n.4 (Cal. 1976)
(addressing Keyes statement regarding dejure segregation); The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 43, 70 n.58 (1974) (stating "constitutionality of de
facto segregation" was "explicitly left open in Keyes"); Comment, Public School
Segregation and the Contours of Unconstitutionality:The Denver School Board Case, 45

U. CoLo. L. REv. 457, 475-76 (1974) ("The questions as to the necessity of
proving intent [to segregate] raised by the Fifth Circuit's disposition of Cisneros
were thus never at issue in the Supreme Court's consideration of Keyes...
[T]he distinction between de jure and de facto segregatory conditions was
never really at issue in the Court's consideration of Keyes.... ."); see also supra

note 168 (discussing constitutionality of de facto segregation).
216 See Morales v. Shannon, 366 F. Supp. 813, 827 (W.D. Tex. 1973),
modified, 516 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1975); Goodman, supra note 168, at 276 n.6
(predicting that Keyes might resolve constitutional status of de facto
segregation); Comment, supra note 215, at 457 n.5 (noting considerable
speculation that Keyes would invalidate de jure/de facto distinction) (citing
Robert L. Herbst, The Legal Struggle to Integrate Schools in the North, 407 ANNALs
AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 43, 60, 62 (1973)).
217 488 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1973).
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trict. The district court found an illegal racial imbalance within
Oxnard's elementary schools resulting from the board's neighborhood school policy.2"' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the district court applied an improper legal
standard in determining whether the board instituted unconstitutional segregation. Relying on Keyes, the court of appeals held that
plaintiffs must establish de jure segregation in order to show a constitutional violation.2 1 9 Thus, the Soria Court interpreted Keyes to
require de jure segregation to establish a constitutional violation.
As discussed, this interpretation was not logically compelled
because the Keyes court never directly addressed that issue.
Federal courts in Texas also interpreted Keyes. In Zamora v. New
Braunfels Independent School District,220 Mexican-Americans sought to

desegregate schools in the district. The district court concluded
that the segregation at issue was not illegal because it was not de

jure segregation.221

The court observed that the Fifth Circuit in

Cisneros had rejected the de jure/de facto analysis.22 2 The district
court, however, held that the Supreme Court in Keyes appeared to
have approved the de jure/de facto distinction. 2 23 The court
acknowledged, however, that the Keyes majority did not directly
218

Id. at 580. Plaintiffs argued that the board could be held accountable

for segregated schools which had resulted from the natural, foreseeable
consequences of its actions and omissions, regardless of any discriminatory
motives behind its acts. Id. The trial court agreed and ruled in plaintiffs'
favor. Id.
219 Id. at 585. The court relied on Keyes for the proposition that a
prerequisite for a finding of unconstitutional board action was a
determination that the board intentionally discriminated against minority
students. Id. The court remanded the case to allow the parties to litigate the
issue of the board's intent. Id. On remand, the district court found
convincing evidence of the board's intent to segregate its elementary schools.
Sofia v. Oxnard Sch. Dist., 386 F. Supp. 539, 540 (C.D. Cal. 1974). Moreover,
the court found that the district was in violation of California law (as
announced in Jackson v. Pasadena City Sch. Dist., 382 P.2d 878 (1963)) that
school boards must alleviate racial imbalance regardless of its cause. Soria, 386
F. Supp. at 545. This claim did not require proof of segregative intent.
220 362 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
221 Id. at 559 ("To the contrary... any existing segregation is purely defacto

and strictly the result of shifting residential patterns within the community.")
222 Id. at 556. The court noted that "[u]ntil last August, the line between
constitutional and unconstitutional segregation had traditionally been drawn
in light of the de facto-dejure dichotomy. It was at that time that the Fifth
Circuit indicated in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi... that this distinction would
not be followed ... " Id.
223

Id. at 557.
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address the question whether to uphold the de jure/de facto categories. 2 4 Without discussing the de jure/de facto distinction, the
Fifth Circuit reversed, 22 5 holding that the record showed that the
school district had a history going back to 1910 of deliberately segregating Mexican-Americans. 2 6
The Zamora trial court's decision illustrates false necessity in civil
rights decision-making. First, the district court admitted that Keyes
had not squarely reached the issue of whether the dejure/de facto
distinction was legitimate. Because the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Cisneros remained binding precedent, the trial court should have held
that plaintiffs need not prove a discriminatory purpose. Second, it
could have found discriminatory intent; the Fifth Circuit found
ample evidence to support such a finding.2 2 7
22 8
The interpretation of Keyes continued in Morales v. Shannon.
Mexican-Americans alleged that, because of the school attendance
zoning plan, Mexican-American students were segregated from
Anglos. 229 Finding no intent to segregate, the Morales court discussed the de jure/de facto distinction. The court acknowledged
that Cisneros held that Mexican-Americans could get a desegregation order without showing an intent to segregate.2 30 The court,

224 Id. ("[T] he [Keyes] majority never squarely faced the issue of whether or
not to perpetuate the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation
225

Zamora v. New Braunfels Indep. Sch. Dist., 519 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.

1975).
226 Id. at 1084 (stating that record demonstrated present segregation of
Mexican-American students was result of NBISD's segregative intent dating
back to 1910 when it built first Mexican school).
227 Id.
228 366 F. Supp. 813 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
229 Id. at 815-16. They also alleged that the district had failed to properly
handle the English language difficulties of the Mexican-American students.
Id. at 816. Two of the four schools were more than 90% Mexican-American.
See id. The court found no evidence of past or present discriminatory intent in
the way the school district assigned students to the elementary schools. Id. at
818. It determined that the location of attendance zones was done on an
ethnically neutral basis, the object being to construct a neighborhood school
system.
230 See id. at 827-28 ("[I]n Cisneros the Fifth Circuit clearly discarded any
finding of discrimination, as opposed to segregation or ethnic isolation, as a
predicate to the authority of the District Court to order a restructuring of a
school district.").
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however, refused to abandon the de jure/de facto analysis.23 1
The court decided not to enter judgment until Keyes was
decided.23 2
After Keyes was decided, the Morales court issued a supplemental
opinion citing Keyes as upholding the de jure/de facto distinction. 23 3 The court found that the segregation was purely de
facto.23 4 The district's motive in drawing attendance zones was to
preserve neighborhood schools and not to segregate. 2 35 On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit disingenuously held that Cisneroshad been
overruled by Keyes on the issue of whether it was necessary to show
discriminatory intent. 236 However, the court ruled that the district
23 7
court's finding of no segregative intent was clearly erroneous.
The decisions of the trial court and the Fifth Circuit to adhere to
the de jure/de facto distinction are questionable. The courts read
Keyes to uphold that distinction despite the fact that the Keyes court
231 Id. at 831. The court stated that it could not "share the Orwellian
proclivity of the majority of the Fifth Circuit who tend to exercise an overzealous intrusion into the affairs of any school district." Id.
232 Id. The Morales court recognized that the Supreme Court had never
addressed the constitutional status of de facto segregation. The court stated:
It is highly significant to the determination of the law to be applied
in this case that the Supreme Court has never written on the
question of school segregation not brought about by the
discriminatory action of school authorities or a State law requiring
separate educational facilities for racial or ethnic minorities that is, De Facto Segregation.
Id. at 827. The court, however, believed that the Supreme Court would decide
"that very question" in Keyes. Id.
233 See id. at 833 (finding that Keyes confirmed that Supreme Court had not
rejected dejure/de facto distinction).
234 See id. (stating that existing segregation was purely de facto and resulted
from neighborhood residential patterns).

235

Id. at 831.

See Morales v. Shannon, 516 F.2d 411,412-13 (5th Cir. 1975). The court
stated: "With respect to the first issue, segregatory intent, we are governed by
Keyes... which supervened our holding in Cisneros v. Corpus Christi... to the
extent that Keyes requires, as a prerequisite to a decree to desegregate a de
facto system, .. . proof of segregatory intent as a part of state action." Id. The
court admitted, "We said not in Corpus Christ4 holding cause and effect a
sufficient basis, but the Supreme Court held to the contrary in Keyes." Id.
237 Id. at 413. As early as 1907, there had been a Mexican school in the
district. Id. In 1954, one school was constructed in a Mexican-American
neighborhood and one in an Anglo area. Id. A neighborhood school plan
was imposed upon this situation. Id. The system froze the Mexican-Americans
into predominantly Mexican-American schools. Id. This was strong evidence
of segregative intent.
236
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had not directly addressed the issue of whether the distinction was
justified. 2 8" The Fifth Circuit's decision in Morales is a key turning
point. Because the court of appeals said that the Supreme Court
took a position in Keyes that it never actually took, Morales is best
viewed as an attempt by the Fifth Circuit to render its decision less
controversial. In short, it was an "easy" way to overrule its own
precedent.
California federal courts also continued their effort to interpret
Keyes. In Ybarra v. City of San Jose,21 9 Mexican-Americans charged
that discriminatory administration of zoning ordinances resulted in
segregated schools. The district court dismissed the case on the
ground that plaintiffs could not make out any showing of de jure
segregation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, observing that the district court's ruling rested on the premise that no
constitutional violation can occur when the school board has followed a neighborhood school policy resulting in an ethnic composition of the schools that merely reflects residential patterns. 4 '
The court stated that the Keyes Court had left this issue open.2 4 1
Thus, because the legal issue was so unsettled, the district court was
24 2
not justified in dismissing the complaint.
This case is significant because the Ninth Circuit recognized that
Keyes did not hold that segregation resulting from a neighborhood
2 44
2 43
school policy was constitutional. Yet the Zamora and Morales
courts cited Keyes as allowing segregation resulting from neighborhood school plans. In this regard, the Ybarra decision is also interesting because it appears to be inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's
238 See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing fact that Keyes
Court did not directly address issue); Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28,
33 (Cal. 1976) (holding that "issue as to whether school districts have an
obligation under the federal Constitution to avoid perpetuation of purely de
facto school segregation remains an open question"). Indeed, the trial court,
in a melodramatic passage, expressed its conviction that Orwellian horrors of
the novel 1984 would result if it abandoned the distinction. Morales, 366 F.
Supp. at 831.
239 503 F.2d 1041 (9th Cir. 1974).
240 Id. at 1042-43.
241 Id. ("The Diaz ruling apparently rested on the premise that no

constitutional violation can occur when the 'School District has adhered to a

"neighborhood school policy," with the result that ethnic composition of the
schools merely reflects residential patterns.' This precise issue was reserved in
Keyes ....
").
242
243
244

Id.
See supra notes 220-27 and accompanying text (discussing Zamora).
See supra notes 228-38 and accompanying text (discussing Morales).
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prior decision in Soria. There, the Ninth Circuit held that Keyes
required plaintiffs to make a showing of de jure segregation, and
that de facto segregation resulting from a neighborhood school
policy was constitutional.2 4 5 Under these circumstances, it appears
that Ybarra represents the mirror image of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Morales-. the Ninth Circuit was limiting its earlier precedent.
Finally, the California Supreme Court sought to construe Keyes.
In Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles,24 6 MexicanAmericans brought a desegregation action against the Los Angeles
school district in 1968. The trial court found that the Los Angeles
public schools were segregated and ordered the board to desegregate the schools.2 4 7 On appeal, the board conceded that the district's schools were segregated but it contended that the
segregation was de facto, and it, therefore, had no constitutional
duty to alleviate the segregation.2 48 The California Supreme Court
stated that the recent federal cases, including Keyes, left open the
issue as to whether school districts had an obligation under the Federal Constitution to avoid perpetuating purely de facto segregation.2 49 Moreover, the court observed that defendants were
ignoring a line of cases construing the California Constitution that
established school boards' obligation to take reasonable steps to
alleviate segregation in public schools, whether the segregation be
de facto or de jure.2 5 Defendant urged the court to abandon this
position but the court stood by its prior decisions.25 1
245

See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text (discussing Soria).

246
247

551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
Id. at 30.

Id. at 33.
Id. The court stated that the United States Supreme Court had never
directly held
that a school district is constitutionally free to ignore the
segregative consequences of adhering to "neutral," facially
nondiscriminatory policies, and in Keyes itself the court explicitly
declared: "We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a
'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial or ethnic
concentrations in the absence of a finding that school authorities
have committed acts constituting de jure segregation."
Id. at 33 n.4 (quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. at 212).
250 Id. at 35 (stating that California school boards are constitutionally
required to take reasonable steps to alleviate school segregation whatever its
cause).
251 Id. at 36. The court emphasized that the harm inflicted on minority
students flows from racial isolation and not from whether the segregation is de
jure or de facto. Id. at 37. It is racial isolation that creates unequal education.
248

249
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Crawford is an excellent example of a court faced with a legally
indeterminate situation. The court had to choose between incompatible rules. One rule would have prohibited only dejure segregation and the other would have barred even de facto segregation.
The court adopted a rule prohibiting de facto segregation. The
case is also highly significant for the California Supreme Court's
recognition that Keyes did not decide whether de facto segregation
offends the United States Constitution. As discussed, 52 other
courts interpreted Keyes differently and cited Keyes for the proposition that only de jure segregation violates the Constitution.
c.

Washington v. Davis: Legal Indeterminacy and the Meaning of
Intent

In 1976, the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis,2 5 3 an
employment discrimination case that would have an impact on
whether only intentionally caused segregation could establish a
constitutional violation. 25 4 At issue was whether plaintiffs could
prove unconstitutional race discrimination without proving discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court acknowledged that some of its
cases indicated that a showing of discriminatory intent was not necessary and that courts of appeals had held in a variety of cases that
equal protection violations could be established without proving
Id. Thus, minorities endure significant harm when they are educated in
segregated schools whatever the source of the segregation may be. Id. In view
of the consequences that segregated schools have traditionally imposed on
minorities, "a school board in this state is not constitutionally free to adopt any
facially neutral policy it chooses, oblivious to such policy's actual differential
impact on the minority children in its schools." Id. at 38. Thus, the court
rejected the de jure/de facto distinction.
252 See supra notes 212-52 (discussing cases after Keyes).
253 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
254 Two African-American police officers filed suit against officers of the
District of Columbia, alleging that the promotion policies of the District's
police department were racially discriminatory. Id. at 232. Among other
things, plaintiffs alleged that the Department's policies discriminated on the
basis of race because they required applicants to take a written personnel test
which excluded a disproportionately high number of African-American
applicants. Id. at 233. The court of appeals held that the lack of
discriminatory intent in designing and administering the test was irrelevant for
determining an equal protection violation based on racial discrimination. Id.
at 237. Rather, the fact that the test had a disproportionate impact on AfricanAmericans "standing alone and without regard to whether it indicated a
discriminatory purpose," was sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.

Id.
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discriminatory intent.2 5 5 Despite these cases' impressive arguments
to the contrary, the Court nonetheless held that proof of discriminatory intent or purpose was necessary in order to prove racial discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause. 2 6 Thus, in
Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court resolved some legal uncertainty by holding that plaintiffs must establish discriminatory intent
in order to prove unconstitutional racial discrimination.2 5 7
That resolution of legal uncertainty, however, was short-lived.
Even if a court concluded that only intentional segregation violated
the Constitution, legal indeterminacy would still be present. Courts
took advantage of legal uncertainty in interpreting the notion of
intent.25 8 In United States v. Texas Education Agency, 259 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Austin School District
intentionally discriminated against Mexican-Americans. 260 The
court observed that the Supreme Court had not made it clear
whether trial courts were to determine discriminatory intent neces255

Id. at 244-45.

256

Id. at 238-45.

See TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1509 (stating that Washington v. Davis would
result in "search for a bigoted decision-maker" in future litigation involving
constitutional claims or racial discrimination directed against facially race257

neutral rules) (citing Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62
MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-54 (1978)). Alan Freeman has argued that the

intent requirement in antidiscrimination law is the result of approaching
racial discrimination from the perspective of its perpetrator. See Freeman,
supra, at 1052-54. According to Freeman, this approach ignores the

perspective of the victim of racial discrimination:

"From the victim's

perspective, racial discrimination describes those conditions of actual social
existence as a member of a perpetual underclass." Id. at 1052. To solve the
problem of race discrimination, then, would require affirmative efforts to
change that condition. Id. at 1053. The perpetrator perspective does not
address that condition because the remedial dimension of the perpetrator
perspective is negative. Id. According to the perpetrator perspective, the goal
of antidiscrimination law is merely to counter the perpetrator's discriminatory

action. Id.
258 Kreimer, supra note 158. See generally Kevin Brown, Termination of Public
School Desegregation: Determination of Unitary Status Based on the Elimination of
Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1131 (1990) (applying
Strauss' discriminatory intent argument to segregation cases); David A.
Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935

(1989) (arguing that discriminatory intent approach is inadequate).
259 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied sub nom. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. United States, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
260

Id. at 163.

604

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 27:555

sary to establish de jure segregation under a subjective standard,
which would require courts to determine whether school officials
had a subjective desire to discriminate, or under an objective standard, by which officials would be held to have intended the reasonable foreseeable consequences of their decisions. 261 The court
chose the objective standard.26 2
In Texas Education, the Fifth Circuit exploited legal indeterminacy in interpreting the notion of intent. The court could have
adopted a subjective test 263 or an objective tort law 264 test. The
court employed the objective tort law test and, thereby, made it
somewhat easier for plaintiffs to show intent to segregate. 65 Thus,
the court used the indeterminacy present in the law on intent and
weakened the de jure segregation requirement. Indeed, one commentator has argued that the objective interpretation of intent as
foreseeability eliminates the distinction between de facto and de
Id. at 167.
The court reasoned that the principle that an actor is held to intend the
reasonably foreseeable results of his actions is firmly rooted in the common
law of torts. Id. at 168. Thus, the court held that "when the official actions
challenged as discriminatory include acts and decisions that do not have a
firm basis in well accepted and historically sound non-discriminatory social
policy, discriminatory intent may be inferred from the fact that those acts had
foreseeable discriminatory consequences." Id. Significantly, the court placed
an important qualification on this test: "As a practical matter, in school
desegregation cases we can envision few official actions, other than the
decision to use a neighborhood school policy for student assignment, that
would not be subject to the 'natural foreseeable consequences' rule." Id.
263 Several other courts have adopted the subjective test for intent. See, e.g.,
Bronson v. Bd. of Educ., 525 F.2d 344 (6th Cir. 1975); Soria v. Oxnard Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 488 F.2d 579, 585 (9th Cir. 1973); see also Kreimer, supra
note 158, at 321 (stating that several cases have equated segregative intent with
decision maker's subjective desire to segregate).
264 Other courts have adopted the objective test for intent. See, e.g., Hart v.
Community Sch. Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975); Morgan v.
Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410, 478 (D. Mass.), affid sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974); see also Kreimer, supra note 158, at 321 (stating
that several courts have held that school board or its members can be liable
for reasonably foreseeable consequences of their actions).
265 See Kreimer, supra note 158, at 325-26. The author states:
[T] he subjective test poses severe evidentiary problems, problems
that stand in the way of consistent and principled adjudication.
Since individual decision-makers will rarely admit improper
motivation, a finding of subjective intent generally must be
inferred from circumstantial evidence. In evaluating such
evidence, no set of facts compels a finding of illicit motivation.
261

262
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jure segregation because, if strictly applied, the objective test
amounts to a rule against all racial imbalance in the public
schools.26 6 The Texas Education court, however, preserved the de
jure/de facto distinction by exempting neighborhood school policies from the natural foreseeable consequences test. This conclusion was unfortunate because school districts generally claim that
they did not intend to segregate children but rather only intended
to have neighborhood schools. The natural foreseeable consequence of the neighborhood school policy will generally be segregated schools because of segregated residential areas. 6 7 Thus, if
courts applied the objective test in this situation, plaintiffs could
show that the district
intended to segregate by its use of a neighbor2 68
plan.
school
hood
266

Id. at 329-30. The author states that when

any racial imbalance exists in a school district, the failure to adopt
policies that alleviate the imbalance necessarily maintains and
perpetuates the imbalance. Such a result is clearly natural and
foreseeable.- Thus, any school authority that tolerates racially
imbalanced schools would be held to have acted with segregative
intent under the foreseeability test.
Id. at 329.
267 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing
Significanceof Racism, 63 U. CoLo. L. REv. 325, 338 (1992). The author reports
that, despite progress in some metropolitan areas, African-Americans and
whites do not commonly live in the same communities. Id. This residential
segregation contributes to segregated schools, neighborhood associations,
parks, and places of worship. Id. He suggests that these conditions should
deeply disturb a society convinced that it has made substantial progress toward
eradicating discrimination. Id.; see also Diaz v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., 733
F.2d 660, 676 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985) (recognizing
that neighborhood school policy would probably perpetuate segregation);
Reynolds Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implicationsfor School Integration,
39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 164 (1975); Dolcia L. Rudley, School Desegregation,
Whose Responsibility?, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 109, 109 n.1 (1986).
268 In United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 600 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1979), the
United States filed an action seeking to desegregate the Lubbock, Texas
Independent School District. The district court found de jure segregation in
nine of the District's twenty-two minority schools. Id. at 521-24. The
segregation in the remaining minority schools was only de facto segregation
resulting from shifting housing patterns. Id. Thus, the district court ordered
desegregation in only nine of the District's twenty-two minority schools. Id.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the case for
additional fact finding. Id. at 527. In particular, the district court was to
determine whether the school board's intentional segregative acts helped
establish the housing patterns, and therefore, caused the segregation in the
remaining minority schools. Id. If so, the segregation in the remaining
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Summary

This completes our review of Mexican-American litigation to
desegregate the public schools in the era of 1970-1980. Cases were
tried throughout Arizona, Texas, Colorado, and California. The
cases indicate that just as their predecessor's had, many courts of
this generation found a way to justify segregation of Mexican-Americans. Previously, Mexican-Americans could be segregated because
of language difficulties and migrant farming patterns. The courts
in this generation rejected these "benign" reasons for segregation,
but developed a more sophisticated doctrine to permit segregation:
the de jure/de facto distinction. Thus, most courts took the position that de facto segregation of Mexican-Americans did not violate
the Federal Constitution. The cases indicate that the decision to
prohibit only de jure segregation was not logically compelled. The
California state courts rejected the dejure/de facto distinction, and
for a time, the Fifth Circuit joined in the effort. - Thus, with respect
to that issue and many others, the cases indicate that courts often
exercised discretion in reaching their conclusions.
B.

Bilingual Education

Mexican-Americans have traditionally done poorly in school
because they have not been proficient in English and because they
have lacked knowledge of their cultural heritage.2 6 9 In response,
Mexican-Americans have brought lawsuits under Tide VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act 270 in order to compel school authorities to
schools would constitute a constitutional violation.

Id. In determining

whether intent existed, the Fifth Circuit instructed the lower court to apply
the objective test it enunciated in United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467
F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972). Id.; see supra notes 260-68 and accompanying text
(discussing objective test).
269 See Kobrick, supra note 149, at 264 ("Far from accomplishing its
professed aim of integrating minorities into the mainstream, the monolingual,
monocultural school system has succeeded only in denying whole generations
of children an education and condemning them to lives of poverty and
despair."); Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to
Bilingual Education, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52, 54 (1979) (documenting
educational problems that Mexican-Americans face because of linguistic
difficulties); Newman, supra note 149, at 577-78 (stating that limited-Englishproficiency students suffer high drop out rates, increased crime rates, and
feelings of inferiority as result of their inability to understand instruction in
English-only classrooms).
270 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1981) provides: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
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provide bilingual/bicultural 71 education. In this area as well, Mexican-Americans felt the effect of legal indeterminacy--in particular,
indeterminacy resulting from the manipulation of precedent to
generate conflicting results.
In Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools,2 72 Mexican-Americans
sought an order requiring the Portales School District to provide
bilingual and bicultural education under Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act.27 Relying on a recent Supreme Court decision, Lau v.
Nichols,2 74 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Portales
School District's failure to provide a bilingual/bicultural educational program so as to provide Mexican-Americans with a meanparticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
271 Bilingual and bicultural instruction combine two distinct components.
Jonathan D. Haft, Assuring Equal Educational Opportunityfor Language-Minority
Students: Bilingual Education and the Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974,
18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 209, 250-51 (1983). The bilingual component
involves native language instruction in substantive courses. Id. The bicultural
component involves instruction in the history and culture relating to the
student's native language in addition to instruction in American culture and
history. Id.
272 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
273 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1981).
274 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lau, non-English speaking students of Chinese
ancestry brought an action against the San Francisco School District, alleging
that the district had violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 564-65.
There were 2856 students of Chinese ancestry in the district who did not speak
English. Id. at 564. The district provided about 1000 of those students with
supplemental courses in the English language. Id. The Court found that the
San Francisco School District had violated Title VI by failing to provide nonEnglish-speaking Chinese students with appropriate instruction designed to
remedy their English language difficulties. Id. at 568. In particular, the Court
held that Title VI, read together with Health, Education and Welfare
regulations, required school boards to take affirmative steps toward rectifying
language deficiencies. Id. at 567-68. The Court ruled that these steps were
necessary to provide students with a meaningful education where school
policies had the effect of discriminating, even in the absence of discriminatory
intent. Id.; see BernardJ. McFadden, BilingualEducation and the Law, 12J.L. &
EDuc. 1, 10 (1983) (outlining guidelines established in Lau). The Lau Court
found that the district's failure to provide appropriate instruction to Chinese
students demonstrated that the Chinese students received fewer benefits from
the school system than the English-speaking majority. Lau, 414 U.S. at 568.
The Court concluded that this amounted to discrimination in violation of
Title VI. Id. Importantly, in Lau, the Supreme Court found a Title VI
violation even though the District had made a significant effort to remedy the
language difficulties by providing supplemental English language instruction.
See id. at 564-65.
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ingful education deprived them of their statutory rights under Title

VI. 275 Significantly, the court reached this conclusion even though
the school district was making a substantial effort to provide compensatory and bilingual instruction.2 7 6
Serna is an important case in the struggle for equal education for
Mexican-Americans. The language and cultural barriers had led to
lower educational achievement and high dropout rates for Mexi-

can-Americans.277 Bilingual education provided a hope that Mexican-Americans would be able to enjoy a meaningful educational
experience.

2 78

Other decisions, however, ignored or interpreted Lau and Serna
to reach different results. For example, in Keyes v. School District No.
1,279 Mexican-Americans alleged that the Denver school board's
failure to adopt a bilingual and bicultural program constituted a
violation of Title VI."2
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the Denver school board had identified 344 students with language difficulties and had determined that 251 of these students
needed special help in acquiring language skills necessary to function satisfactorily in school. 281' The court also found that the district had implemented various programs to address the students'

275 See Serna, 499 F.2d at 1153-54 (stating that district had failed to establish
a remedial program that would ensure meaningful education for children).
The court affirmed the trial court's order that the school district provide
plaintiffs with a bilingual/bicultural program which would ensure that
Mexican-Americans receive a meaningful education. Id. at 1154.
276 Serna v. Portales Mun. Sch., 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D.N.M. 1972)
(stating district had several Mexican-American teachers, provided bilingual/
bicultural program for first grades, and provided limited program in English
as second language in second through sixth grades); Grubb, supra note 269, at
61 ("The facts in Serna indicated that school officials had made significant
commitments to compensatory and bilingual instruction.").
277 Grubb, supra note 269, at 54-55; Newman, supra note 149, at 577-78.
278 See Peter D. Roos, BilingualEducation: The HispanicResponse to Unequal
Educational Opportunity, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 111 (1978) ("A

common sentiment among Hispanics... is ... that for Hispanics to overcome
the effects of decades of discrimination, the primary focus should be on
bilingual and bicultural education."); Grubb, supra note 269, at 56.
279 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided this case following remand to the district court by the Supreme Court
in Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
280 Keyes, 521 F.2d at 481.
281 Id. at 483 n.22.
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needs. 282 The court
found that the record could not support a vio28 s
VI.
Title
of
lation
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Keyes is questionable. First, the
court did not explain why those facts could not amount to a violation of Title VI. Second, the court did not discuss Lau or its very
recent decision in Serna and, therefore, did not explain how its ruling was consistent with those cases.
One possible reading of the Tenth Circuit decision in Keyes is that
it stands for the proposition that there could be a Title VI violation
only if a school board had taken no steps to remedy language difficulties.28 4 If that is the meaning of Keyes, then it is not surprising
why the court failed to distinguish Lau or Serna. Lau and Serna are
not distinguishable on that ground. In Lau, the school district had
made a substantial effort to remedy the English language difficulties.28 5 Similarly, in Serna, the Portales schools had made a significant effort to alleviate the language problem and even had a
bilingual program for first graders and an English as a second language program.28 6 In Serna, the Tenth Circuit found these efforts
insufficient and ordered the school district to enlarge the program.28 7 Thus, Lau and Serna provided authority for the propositions that (1) a school district could violate Title VI even though it
had taken some steps to correct language difficulties, and (2) a
school district could be ordered to enlarge its effort and create a
full blown bilingual and bicultural program. Other courts also
found violations of Title VI where the school district had taken
some steps to remedy language problems.28 8
Another key case interpreting Lau and Serna arose in Colorado.
In Otero v. Mesa County Valley School District,2

9

Mexican-Americans

filed a class action to compel the school district to provide bilingual
282
283

Id.
Id.

284 See Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elem. Sch., 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 n.7
(9th Cir. 1978) (suggesting this interpretation of Keyes).
285 See supra note 276 (describing school district's efforts).
286 Serna, 351 F. Supp. at 1281.
287
288

Id. at 1281-82.

See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 18-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding
statutory violation even though school district offered some bilingual
education); Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 5964 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding statutory violation even though school district
provided bilingual program in grades one through five).
289 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975), vacated, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir.
1977).
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and bicultural education. The court held that the district had complied with Title VI by making an effort to solve language
problems.29 ° Unlike the Keyes court, the Otero court distinguished
Lau and Serna on the ground that they dealt with a school board
that had made no real effort to remedy the language problem. 291
Thus, the court read Lau and Serna to support the finding of a Title
VI violation only where the school district had taken no meaningful
steps to resolve language problems. The court also distinguished
Lau and Serna on the theory that they dealt with large numbers of
students who had language deficiencies; in Otero, about eight percent of the students had language problems.2 92
The court's effort to distinguish Lau and Serna is not persuasive.
As discussed, those cases are not distinguishable on the ground that
they involved districts that had taken no substantial affirmative steps
to remedy language problems.2 9 3 Moreover, the Otero court's effort
to distinguish Lau and Serna on the basis of the number of Hispanics involved was questionable. Other courts found that failure to
provide bilingual education to small numbers of students supported a Title VI violation.29 4
The meaning of Serna was also at issue in Guadalupe Organization
v. Tempe Elementary School District.29 5 Mexican-Americans brought an
action to compel the Tempe Elementary School District to provide

all non-English speaking Mexican-Americans with bilingual/bicultural education. 296 The Ninth Circuit held that the requirements
290
291

Id. at 171.

Id. The court noted that "Lau and Serna dealt with school boards which
were making no real effort to meet the problem. We deal with a school board
which is making a real, conscientious effort to recognize, face and solve any
problem which may exist as to any students." Id.
292 See id. ("Lau and Sema both had to do with large numbers of students
who had language deficiencies and who could not learn in English. Our case
involves a very few, if any, students who have real language deficiency.").
293 See supra notes 272-88 and accompanying text (analyzing Lau and
Serna).
294 See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 17-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding
violation where only seven percent of students were Hispanics); Cintron v.
Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455 F. Supp. 57, 59-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(finding violation where about 20% of students were Hispanic).
295 587 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1978).
296 Id. at 1024. Plaintiffs claimed that their rights to equal educational
opportunities had been disregarded in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause and that the school district's failure to provide bilingual education
violated their rights under § 601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. The district
granted defendant summary judgment. Id.
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of Title VI were met because the district provided plaintiffs with
remedial instruction in English.2 9 7 The court distinguished Serna
on the grounds that no affirmative steps had been taken by the district in that case to rectify language difficulties.2 9 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit also read Serna to authorize the finding of a Title VI violation only where the school district had taken no steps to remedy
language problems.
Guadalupe Organization further illustrates false necessity in civil
rights judicial decision making. The court's effort to distinguish
Serna was not persuasive. As noted, Serna is not distinguishable on
the ground that it involved a district that had taken no affirmative
steps to remedy language problems. -Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, Serna could have been read to support the proposition that a district could violate Title VI even if it had taken
significant action to resolve language difficulties.
The Mexican-American's struggle for bilingual and bicultural
education began on a promising note in Serna. However, other
courts so severely limited Serna that Mexican-Americans would not
be able to compel a school district to provide them with bilingual/
bicultural education so long as the district had taken some steps to
remedy language difficulties. Thus, Mexican-Americans sustained a
significant defeat in this area.
III.

SUMMARY AND AN ALTERNATIVE VISION

This article has sought to expose how courts have exercised their
judicial discretion in the context of Mexican-Ameican civil rights
litigation. The article has argued that the resolution of key issues
often was not inevitable because of legal uncertainty or indeterminacy. Judges often exercised discretion to reach their conclusions.
Part III seeks to draw some general conclusions and place this article in the context of a larger effort to generate racial reform.
First, the cases indicate that a number of courts generally exercised their discretion by taking a position against Mexican-Americans on key issues. For example, in the effort to desegregate public
accommodations, the courts ruled against Mexican-Americans
297 Id. at 1029 (holding that remedial instruction in English met
requirements of Title VI by providing meaningful education and equal
educational opportunity).
298 Id. at 1029 n.7 (stating that Serna found a Title VI violation where "no
affirmative steps were taken by the Portales school district to rectify... language
deficiencies").
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where they might have done otherwise.2 9 9 Likewise, the judiciary
chose to reject Mexican-American efforts to reclaim land.3 0 ° Similarly, with respect to the effort to desegregate the public schools,
most courts exercised their discretion to permit the segregation of
Mexican-Americans for "benign" reasons - e.g., linguistic difficul02
ties3°1-or because the segregation was "merely" de facto.1
Finally, with respect to bilingual education, courts generally exercised discretion to limit access to bilingual and bicultural
education.30 3
At one level, exposing the exercise ofjudicial discretion is important because it helps reveal the extent to which the courts have
helped, or failed to help establish the rights of Mexican-Americans. 0 4 In this regard, the inescapable conclusion is that courts
could have done significantly more to help establish the rights of
Mexican-Americans. 0 5
In this connection, critical race scholars have argued that civil
rights gains tend to be cut back. 0 6 This article provides new support for that argument. The cases reveal that the rights of MexicanAmericans were often cut back through the use of judicial discretion. For example, in the area of school desegregation, the early
299 See supra notes 14-50 and accompanying text (discussing cases
addressing public accommodations).
300 See supra notes 51-63 and accompanying text (discussing cases
addressing land grants).
301 See supra notes 94-126, 143-50 and accompanying text (discussing cases
in which school districts justified their actions based on students' language
abilities).
302 See supra notes 157-252 and accompanying text (discussing cases
addressing de facto segregation).
303 See supra notes 269-98 and accompanying text (discussing bilingual
education).
304 Cf NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 617 (stating that it is only
against background of Supreme Court legal history "that one can understand
the basis for recent decisions and the degree to which the Supreme Court as
an institution has helped, or failed to help, establish the rights of racial
minorities"); HiGGIaomTHAM, supra note 14, at 7 (analyzing role courts and
legislatures played in suppression of African-Americans).

305 Cf

DERRICK BELL, AND WE

ARE NOT

SAVED

51-74 (1987) (questioning

effectiveness of civil rights litigation and reliance on courts to induce racial
reform); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 7 (documenting "vacillation of the
courts [and] the state legislatures... in trying to decide whether blacks were
people").
306 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences
and the Dilemma of Social Reform, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 639, 656 (1993) (arguing
that civil rights, once won, are generally cut back).
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cases held that Mexican-Americans could not be segregated solely
on the basis of race." °7 That right, however, was immediately limited because most courts allowed the segregation of Mexican-Americans for "benign" reasons, and school boards often justified
segregation on that basis."0 ' Similarly, after the Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, most courts narrowly inter-

preted Brown to bar only de jure segregation." 9 Thus, the Court's
refusal to bar de facto segregation limited the rights of MexicanAmericans. Finally, in the area of bilingual education, the courts
construed earlier cases so as to limit the right to bilingual
education. 1 0
These conclusions are important; however, this article seeks to do
more than merely establish these negative conclusions. The article
seeks to help establish the hope of racial reform. In this regard,
there is reason to believe that exposing the lack of inevitability in
civil rights decision-making may help break down barriers to racial
reform. Critical race scholars have argued that a significant barrier
to racial reform is the majoritarian mindset. 3 11 Richard Delgado
has described this mindset as "the bundle of presuppositions,
received wisdom, and shared understandings against a background
of which legal [decision-making] takes place. "312
The view thatjudicial decision-making is highly influenced by the
perspective and preconceptions of the judge, and that the perspective of the dominant group may present a barrier to racial reform,
finds substantial support in the recent revival of pragmatism in
legal philosophy.3 13 Pragmatists treat "thinking as contextual and
See supra notes 94-150 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-150 and accompanying text.
309 See supra notes 161-268 and accompanying text.
310 See supra notes 269-298 and accompanying text.
311 Richard Delgado, The Inward Turn in OutsiderJurisprudence, 34 WM. &
MARy L. REv. 741, 745-46 (1993); see Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term
- Forward: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARv. L. REv. 4, 8-11 (1985)
(discussing role myths play in guiding racial policy).
312 Delgado, supra note 11, at 2413; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 267, at
327 ("The act of judging necessarily is predicated upon a range of political,
psychological and social assumptions that cannot simply be discarded or
overcome; without them, adjudication would be impossible."); Delgado, supra
note 311, at 746 (describing majoritarian mindset as "the group of 'truths,'
myths, and received wisdom that persons in the dominant group bring to
discussions about race").
313 See generally Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal
Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569, 1569-1853 (1990).
307
308
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situated." 14 Thinking is "always embodied in practices-habits and
patterns of perceiving and conceiving."315 Thus, pragmatists have
recognized that one cannot view the world except through one's
preconceptions.3 16 Applying this notion to legal decision-making,
they have emphasized the importance of context and perspective to
the act of judging.117 Significantly, pragmatists also have recognized that the dominant perspective can stand in the way of racial
reform. 3 1 Both critical race scholars and pragmatists offer a similar explanation for why the dominant perspective may inhibit
reform. The general idea is that the dominant perspective or mindset makes current social and legal arrangements seem fair and natural. 319 Bringing this mindset to the bench, judges may commit
moral error in civil rights cases because narrow habits of perceiving
20
lead them to believe that the way things are is inevitable or just.
One way to help judges break down mindset, broaden their perspectives, and promote justice in civil rights cases, is to provide
counterstories-i.e., explain how decisions were not inevitable.321
Through this process judges can "overcome ethnocentrism and the
unthinking conviction that [their] way of seeing the world is the
only one-that the way things are is inevitable, natural, just, and
best" and thereby avoid moral error when deciding any civil rights
314 Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 798
(1989).
315 Id. (emphasis in original omitted).
316 Minow, supra note 13, at 46; see also HiL.RY PuTNAM, REASON TRuTh AND
HISTORY 50 (1981) ("There is no God's Eye point of view that we can know or
usefully imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons
reflecting various interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories
subserve.").
317 Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REv.
1597, 1600 (1990).
318 See MargaretJ. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S.CAL.L. REv.
1699, 1722-23 (1990) (noting that at time Pessy was decided, it corresponded
with "old description of the world, composed by the dominant order and
expressed in its institutions").
319 See Delgado, supra note 11, at 2413; Minow, supra note 13, at 54
("Connected with many of the other assumptions is the idea that critical
features of the status quo - general social and economic arrangements - are
natural and desirable.").
320 Delgado, supra note 11, at 2416-17.
321 See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 13, at 1958 (discussing ways judges
can avoid these types of mistakes); Delgado, supra note 11, at 2413 (discussing
ways of destroying mindset).
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case.3 22 Similarly, pragmatists have stressed that justice may be
advanced only if judges try to grasp the world from perspectives
that run counter to the dominant perspective. 23 In particular,
some pragmatists have urged judges to try to grasp the world from
the perspective of the dominated or the oppressed. 2 4 As Martha
Minow has explained, the effort to take the perspective of another
may help us see that our perspective is limited and that the status
quo is not inevitable or fair.3 25 This article has sought, in part, to
breakdown narrow habits of perceiving that stand in the way of
racial reform, by offering alternative perspectives or counterstories
that explain how decisions were not inevitable.
Some commentators have questioned whether counterstories can
transform the consciousness of the dominant group.3 26 Contrary to
those commentators, however, the idea that generating alternative
visions of reality can advance racial reform finds important support
in the philosophy of science and contemporary philosophy of law.
In this regard, it is helpful to consider Thomas Kuhn's classic
account of scientific change.32 7 Kuhn argued that during periods
of normal science, perception is dependent on conventional "paradigms."328 According to Kuhn, a scientific revolution occurs when
322 Delgado, supra note 11, at 2439; see also Minow, supra note 13, at 60
(discussing effect of judges trying to observe through other perspectives).
323 See Minow, supra note 13, at 95 ("Justice is engendered when judges
admit the limitations of their own viewpoints, when judges reach beyond those
limits by trying to see from contrasting perspectives, and when people seek to
exercise power to nurture differences, not to assign and control them.");
Radin, supra note 318, at 1724 (discussing different viewpoints on judiciary's
role).
324 See Minow, supra note 13, at 79 (discussing adopting perspective of
another); Radin, supra note 318, at 1724 ("[T]he best role for the judge ... is
to try to grasp the world from the perspective of the dominated, to hear the
outsiders who have been silent and are now trying to speak. ..."); DEBORAH L.
RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 317 (1989) ("A crucial insight is that decisions
about getting from here to there - wherever there might be - must be made
not from the top down but from the bottom up.").
325 Minow, supra note 13, at 60; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the

Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 321,

324 (1987) (arguing that adopting perspective of those at bottom - least
advantaged - can promote justice).
326 See Farber & Sherry, supranote 11, at 824-27 (observing that "conversion
stories are notably scarce").
327

See

THOMAS

S.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(2d

ed. 1970).
328 See id. at 10. Kuhn defines paradigms as "accepted examples of actual
scientific practice -

examples which include law, theory, application, and
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there is a transition from one paradigm to another.3 9 Paradigm
changes cause scientists to see the world differently.330 At times of
scientific revolution, then, scientists experience shifts of perception-the scientists' perception of their environment must be reeducated.3 3 1 According to Kuhn, the transition between competing
paradigms is a conversion experience that cannot be forced by
332
logic.
Applying these notions to judicial decision-making, one leading
pragmatist and philosopher of law, Judge Richard Posner, has
recently argued that major changes in law often result from a similar conversion process. 33
Such conversion involves a perceptual
shift where one comes to see the world differently.3 34 According to
Judge Posner, this process explains the major shifts that have
occurred in law, including the expansion and recognition of civil
rights.3 3 5 Thus, the key turning points in American law simply
instrumentation together [which] provide models from which spring
particular coherent traditions of scientific research." Id. Subsequently, Kuhn
identified two primary meanings of paradigms "exemplars, which are
concrete problem solutions accepted by the scientific community" and
"disciplinary matrixes, which are the shared elements which account for the
relatively unproblematic character of professional communication and the
relative unanimity of professional judgment in a scientific community, and
have as components symbolic generalizations, shared commitments to beliefs
in particular models, shared values, and shared exemplars." FREDERICK SUPPE,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc THEORIES 138 (1974).
329 KUHN, supra note 327, at 12; see also SUPPE, supra note 328, at 146-47
(stating that scientific revolution "requires rejecting the old disciplinary
matrix in favor of another which contains the new theory").
330 See KUHN, supra note 327, at 111 (stating that paradigm changes lead
scientists to adopt new instruments and to look in new places); SuPPE, supra
note 328, at 149 ("The conceptual changes which come from accepting a new
disciplinary matrix are like a gestalt switch; two observers looking at the same
things from within different disciplinary matrixes see different things.").
331 See KUHN, supra note 327, at 112-13 (describing experiments on
reeducation process of scientists).
332 See id. at 150-51 (noting that acceptance of paradigm shifts often occurs
over long period of time); SUPPE, supra note 328, at 150 (stating that "conflict
between incommensurable disciplinary matrixes . . . can only be resolved by
persuasion and not logical argument").
333 POSNER, supra note 9, at 459; see also Radin, supra note 318, at 1725
(stating changes in law come about through paradigm shifts).
334 POSNER, supra note 9, at 149 (citing LUDWIG WrITGENSTEIN, ON
CERTAINTY, at 14(e), 1 92 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. Von Wright eds. 1969)).
335 See POSNER, supra note 9, at 151 (stating that conversion process
explains "many of the seismic shifts that have occurred in our law, such as the
great expansion of liability on virtually all fronts since the 1950s, the
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reflect changing oudooks." 6 Judges and lawyers began to look at
legal doctrine in a new way.'" Accordingly, there is reason to
believe that providing judges with alternative perspectives or
counterstories
may help stimulate a paradigm shift in the area of
8
race.

3

3

Beyond this, exposing the exercise of discretion through counterstories is one way to help insure that the Mexican-American experience is reflected in legal discourse. In this regard, feminists have
argued that women's experience has not been recognized by the
law."3 9 To solve the problem of women's exclusion from legal discourse, Robin West has suggested that women must flood the legal
market with their own stories." ° In this way, legal discourse is
forced to consider the perspective of women. 4 1 For similar reasons, critical race scholars have emphasized the importance of telling the silenced stories and unrecorded perspectives of outsider
groups.3 4 2 Thus, by offering counterstories, this Article has sought
to help insure that legal discourse takes accounts of the MexicanAmerican experience.
Finally, by exposing the lack of inevitability in judicial decisionmaking, and revealing the role of discretionary policy choices
which create and shape our society, it may also be possible to gain a
renewed sense of community. Recently, legal scholars have emphasized the importance of promoting communitarian values.343 Pragmatism suggests that exposing the lack of inevitability in judicial
decision-making may foster a sense of community. As one of the

expansion in the rights of criminal defendants and of prisoners, the increased
recognition of women's rights, the explosive growth of constitutional law").
336
337

Id. at 152.
Id. at 151-52.

338 Cf Radin, supra note 318, at 1722 (arguing that paradigm shifts in law
are necessary in order to change status quo for oppressed people).
339 See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 60
(1988).
340 See id. at 65.

341

See id. at 70.

See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as
Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2231, 2256 (1992).
343 See generally Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988); H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1703, 1703
(1988) (stating that modem republicanism seeks to recognize and foster
community).
342
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leaders in the revival of American pragmatism, Richard Rorty, 4 4
has explained, when the contingent character of human projects is
recognized, "[o]ur identification with our community-our society,
3 45
our political tradition, our intellectual heritage-is heightened."
This occurs "when we see this community as ours rather than
nature's, shapedrather than found, one among many which men have
made." 4 6 Similarly, once the contingent character of judicial decision-making is fully recognized, it may generate a renewed sense of
community-the community may be viewed as ours rather than
nature's.
CONCLUSION

This article has explored ajurisprudential point: legal indeterminacy in the context of Mexican-American civil rights litigation. The
article argues that because of legal uncertainty or indeterminacy
the resolution of key issues was not inevitable. Judges often had
discretion to reach their conclusions. In this regard, the article
concludes that the courts generally exercised their discretion by
taking a position on key issues against Mexican-Americans. The
article points out that exposing the exercise of judicial discretion
and the lack of inevitability in civil rights cases is important for two
major reasons. At one level, exposing the exercise of judicial discretion is significant because it helps reveal the extent to which the
courts have helped, or failed to help establish the rights of MexicanAmericans. Thus, the article concludes that the courts could have
done significantly more to help establish such rights.
The article, however, seeks to do more than establish that important conclusion. The article argues that exposing the lack of inevitability in civil rights decision-making may help break down barriers
to racial reform. Drawing on critical race theory, legal pragmatism
and the philosophy of science, the article argues that justice can be
promoted in civil rights cases by providing judges with an alternative perspective on civil rights issues.

344 See RIcHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM
IRONY AND SOLIDARITY
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NAruRE (1979).
RORTY,

CONTINGENCY,

(1989);

345 RORTY, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 344, at 166.
346

Id.

(1982); RICHARD
RICHARD

RORTY,

